


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Near East & South Asia

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Near East & South Asia

PAKISTAN

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International Affairs

Commentary Condemns American Thinking on South Asia

93AS0109F Islamabad *THE MUSLIM in English*
22 Oct 92 p 6

[Article: "The Direction of American Thinking on South Asia"]

[Text] It is unfortunate that official institutions in the country are allowed to be used as sounding boards for American policy projection—thinly veiled in the guise of academic discourse. The Institute of Strategic Studies is particularly guilty of allowing itself to be abused in this way—or perhaps our ruling elites feel compelled to project the American global policy agenda.

In any event, the most recent American "scholarly discourse" showed the clear direction of American thinking relating to South Asia. It also revealed the utter failure of the United States to pressurise India into making any concessions on its nuclear programme. For the Indophiles within American opinion-makers this has presented an ideal opportunity to push for a strategic sop for India in the form of a permanent seat in a restructured UN Security Council.

While the present structure of the Security Council is an absurdity in the face of the altered global politico-economic milieu, India's claim to a permanent Security Council seat is equally absurd. Not only will it not rectify the imbalance of international representation within the Security Council—either economically, politically or militarily—it will be legitimising a leadership role for India which is not acceptable even within that country's own regional environment.

Given the new global ideological and economic divides, if the United Nations Security Council is to be restructured—and it surely needs to be if it is to have any shade of realism about it—representation of the Islamic World, along with the case for Japan which is already being made, must be a basic demand from the Muslim states across the globe—given that they comprise a large segment of the international comity of states. The modalities of this representation may be up for debate, but in principle an acceptance of this demand from the international community must be sought. As it is, in the present set-up, there is little to protect the genocide of Muslim populations in regions like Europe and Asia in international fora like the United Nations.

Yet undermining the capabilities of Muslim states seems part of the intellectual baggage of the American analysts—reflecting the perfect coordination that exists between American government policy and its political analysts and academia on global objectives. This is abundantly clear in the American approach to the whole issue of nuclear proliferation—at the official and unofficial levels. While the American government has yet to apply any pressure—such as legislative devices like the

Pressler Amendment—on Israel to destroy (or even freeze) its nuclear weapons capability, American analyst offer ever-more ingenious and ludicrous justifications for Israel's continuing nuclear-power status!

As for Pakistan, it is continuously being driven home to this nation that the United States cannot accept a nuclear status for Pakistan—regardless of the regional and national security imperatives. While the American government uses negative pressure, American analysts are attempting to use a patronisingly conciliatory approach! The critical point here is that the objective of both approaches is the same—to weaken Pakistan's defence capabilities and compel it into a compromise with India. This would of course lay the path for India's assertion of a role as a regional hegemon and in the post-bipolar world would allow the United States to cooperate militarily and economically with India—this being seen as a viable counter to Chinese and Japanese influence in the region.

These designs are perfectly understandable from an American perspective. What is amazing is that the Americans still fail to accept that there is at least no identity problem for the Pakistani nation anymore in that it now comprises primarily those who since birth have known of identifying with only one state—that of Pakistan. The ignorance of the Americans becomes even more glaring when they seem to be oblivious of the fact that both Pakistan and India were created out of the colonial empire of British India—an entity that had no previous existence in that coalesced form. So it merely undermines the credibility of American scholars when they repeat the Indian propagandist refrain of Pakistan being "carved out of India." Of course, it does reflect the effectiveness of Indian propaganda that foreign scholars succumb to it so rapidly in the course of their stay there!

Regional Affairs

Kashmir: US for Solution Per Simla Accord

93AS0104C Islamabad *THE MUSLIM in English*
9 Oct 92 p 1

[Text] Peshawar, Oct 8—U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan Nicholas Platt said the American policy on Kashmir has not changed which supports its solution in accordance with the Simla Accord.

Addressing a Press conference here on Thursday, the U.S. ambassador said, America believed that Pakistan and India should resolve this dispute bearing in mind the United Nations resolution. He said there was growing sense of seriousness of the Kashmir issue among the people of America.

He said, "I am of the opinion that Pakistan and India should solve this problem and we will support the process coming from the international community including the U.N." He said, Pakistan and India should solve the Kashmir issue by themselves.

When asked to comment on Afghan issue, the U.S. Ambassador said, "the United States is not trying to impose its formula on Afghanistan. We will support whatever the Afghans will decide for themselves."

About the present set-up in Afghanistan, he said, "we support the process going on but we do not support shelling of cities and innocent citizens by anyone. The United States supported the present government in Afghanistan and the Peshawar Agreement," he added.

In reply to a question Mr. Platt said, although there was no U.S. representative in Kabul but the local staff was working there to safeguard American interests. When the situation became normal in Kabul, American representative would be sent there, he added.

To a question the U.S. ambassador said, the Stinger missiles given to Mujahideen should be returned as the war was over.

He, however, pointed towards the differences between the U.S. and Pakistan on the nuclear issue which, he said, were yet to be solved.

To a question about economic assistance to Pakistan, the U.S. ambassador, said, "we understand that Pakistan needs economic assistance. During the last two/three years, the U.S. Government provided about 200 million dollars a year to Pakistan.

He appreciated the gesture of people of Pakistan demonstrated during his tenure of about one year.—APP

ISI Arms Trafficking to Afghanistan

93AS0065A Lahore *THE NATION* in English
28 Sep 92 pp 1, 4

[Article by Shakeel Anjum: "ISI (Information Service of India) Men Were Involved in Arms Trafficking"]

[Text] Rawalpindi—"Former ISI [Information Service of India] officials, deputed on important assignments, were involved in arms and ammunition smuggling to the neighbouring countries, during the Afghan Jihad under the cover of a fictitious electronic company and maintained contacts with a General of Iranian Air Force, a Jewish lady and some important personalities living near Kasur border."

This was alleged by a former pilot of Pakistan Air Force, Akram Awan, sustaining sentence of 14 years of imprisonment in Adiala Jail, Rawalpindi, on charges of keeping contacts with foreign agencies, while recording his statement before the C-130 Judicial Commission on the second day of proceeding here on Sunday morning.

The C-130 Judicial Commission headed by Mr. Justice Shafiur Rehman as its president, Mr. Justice Shaikh Riaz Ahmad, Judge Lahore High Court and Mr. Justice Imam Ali G. Kazi, Judge Sindh High Court as members, proceeded the inquiry in library room of the Supreme Court.

The convicted former pilot was presented to record his statement before the commission as the Commission had announced that any person can apply for appearance before the commission if he has any evidence regarding the crash of C-130.

The ex-pilot, in his statement, disclosed some startling facts about the top brass paying little heed to the C-130 crash. However, the commission repeatedly asked him to confine himself to details about the C-130 crash. The commission also observed that the statement of the ex-pilot should be taken only as a statement and not as a whole truth because every one who appears before the commission for evidence, consider himself to be in possession of whole truth which is not the case.

Regarding his statement, the pilot told the commission that he was sentenced by the Court Martial in 1985 on the charge of leaving the country without permission and was sentenced to one year imprisonment. After completing his imprisonment, he joined a medicos company and during his employment, he met an ex-Flight Lt. Ahmed Saeed, the ex-pilot added, who was later identified as Major Amir of the ISI. He further told the court that the ex-Flight Lt. Ahmad Saeed, actually Major Amir, offered him to join company ostensibly dealing with computers, but he later came to know that the company in fact was involved in the smuggling of arms to neighbouring countries. He said that the arms being smuggled were supplied from Ojhri camp, the ammunition dump situated in Rawalpindi.

Akram Awan told the commission that he was not allowed to leave the country, but "when I came across two other officials of the ISI, Col. Saddiq and Col. Malik, who were also involved in the arms smuggling, told me that there was restriction on him to leave the country from any side.

The ex-pilot maintained that after knowing that the company was involved in arms smuggling, he tried to contact the then ISI chief General Hameed Gul and approached him through Col. Bashir. He said, while recording his statement that he had a dinner with Gen. Hameed Gul where Brig. Siddique Awan, Col. Bashir and Brig. Imtiaz were also present. They wanted to utilise his contacts with the Iranians for making recoveries of arms supplied to Iran, he added.

Akram Awan told the commission that he was not satisfied with his meeting with the then ISI chief and thereafter he tried to approach Gen. Ziaul Haq through Brig. Saddiq Malik but could not succeed. He said that later he contacted Embassy of the United States in Islamabad through Col. Dwarkin and Brig. Yasin and supplied photocopies of arms deal which he got while working in the electronic company. He also informed Brig. Fatimi, the Military Attache of Egypt and the Commercial Secretary of Iran, to seek their intervention, he added.

Akram Awan, during his statement, tried to establish some links with the smuggling of arms by ISI officials and the crash of C-130 without producing any substantial evidence.

Former plot Akram Awan was arrested on May 11, 1988 by the Military Police and was kept in Field Investigation Cell near Military Hospital Rawalpindi. Lt. Gen. Hameed Gul and the then vice chief of army staff Aslam Beg themselves interrogated him in his cell. They wanted to know what documents he supplied to the foreign embassies.

Akram Awan alleged that the then vice chief of army staff Aslam Beg and ISI Air Marshal (Retd) Zulfiqar of PPP and American CIA were involved in C-130 crash. He told the commission that he was produced before a magistrate in Rawalpindi who recorded his 53-page statement which, according to him was taken under duress. He was later produced before Court Martial following a temporary confinement in AJK [Azad Jammu and Kashmir]. The Court Martial sentenced him to 14 years imprisonment under the charges of having contacts with foreign intelligence agencies including Mossad of Israel, American CIA and Indian RAW [Research and Analysis Wing]. He maintained that during his confinement in AJK, he was repeatedly visited by Hameed Gul, Gen. Aslam Beg and other ISI officials.

The former pilot confirmed about his contacts with Israeli Mossad by saying that in Sweden he came in contacts with a Jewish girl who had been working for Mossad. With the help of this Jewish girl, he added, he visited Israel and remained there for more than 10 days.

He admitted before the commission that during stay to Israel, he was asked by Israeli intelligence authorities to provide them information about the Kahuta nuclear plant. "I told them that I was a Air Force deserter and I did not have any access to Kahuta plant, therefore, I cannot provide them any information," he added.

He also disclosed that he was sponsored by the Israeli intelligence authorities to work for them in Syria.

Relations With Sri Lanka Viewed After Premadasa Visit

93AS0065E Lahore *THE NATION* in English
26 Sep 92 p 6

[Editorial: "Pak-Sri Lanka Relations"; quotation marks as published]

[Text] Sri Lankan President Ranasinghe Premadasa's state visit to Pakistan was apparently a routine matter, like so many other heads of state and government

making goodwill trips to distant lands in pursuit of their diplomatic obligations. And in recent weeks there has virtually been an unending procession of VVIPs from abroad, including the high-profile visit of the Iranian President, which denied the Premadasa visit the publicity it ought to have received in the country. Although Pakistan and Sri Lanka are not bound by ties of religion, culture or history and are not even geographically located close enough to be called neighbours, they share a common destiny as partners in peace, security and development of the region to which they belong. The visit of the Sri Lankan President, who is currently also the SAARC [South East Asian Association for Regional Cooperation] Chairman, was, therefore, the expression of a special relationship between the two countries. In the wake of regional groupings making their mark in global politics, and accent on regional economic cooperation becoming the order of the day, South Asia has to sooner or later find a 'viable strategy' to override its lag in evolving a genuine regional perspective. Needless to say, the 'big brother' in the region has been the villain of the piece of forestalling the emergence of SAARC as a meaningful forum, and the task of pooling in resources or making collective efforts for the common good of the region has remained a far cry because of the climate of distrust and insecurity that prevails in the region.

Pakistan and Sri Lanka, more or less, share a common outlook on the problem of Indian hegemonism, as both have been the victims of New Delhi's politics of bullying and blackmail. No wonder the Indians have been apprehensive of, what they called, 'ganging up' of small nations in the SAARC. The high-handed manner in which successive governments in New Delhi have tried to browbeat Sri Lanka into abject submission has left a pronounced mark on Sri Lankan politics, and though the tiny island state has been in no position to stop the 'big brother' from its covert interference, it has shown remarkable courage and resilience to face up to the challenge. Ironically enough, the country which has been plagued by a bloody ethnic war, has been able to sustain a tension-free relationship among its religious communities, including the Muslims who constitute a sizable minority in Sri Lanka. The fact that Muslims in Sri Lanka, unlike their counterparts in India, have not only been living in peace and harmony, but have also enjoyed rights and privileges that can ensure a life of honor and dignity for a minority clearly brings out the even-handed policy of the Sri Lankan government. And perhaps there would not have been ethnic violence of the scale that Sri Lanka has experienced over years if the Tamil separatists had not been initially propped up, trained, and armed by New Delhi to have a leverage in Sri Lankan politics. Pakistan-Sri Lanka ties may have a low priority in the Foreign Office's agenda, but if Islamabad is keen on playing a significant role in South Asia, in particular to contain new Delhi's clout on the diplomatic front, it must take a comprehensive initiative to evolve a joint strategy of the small nations in the region. Sri Lanka will obviously be a 'key link' in such a strategy.

Internal Affairs

Assembly Debate on MQM Plan to Create Separate Province

BK1810165892 Islamabad Radio Pakistan Network in English 1600 GMT 18 Oct 92

[Text] The interior minister, Chaudhary Shujat Hussain, has said that Jinnahpur conspiracy [creation of a separate province] was the brainchild of the PDA [People's Democratic Alliance] and it has nothing to do with reality. He was winding up a two-hour discussion on identical adjournment motions moved by several PDA and JI [Jamaat-i-Islami] members in the National Assembly this evening.

Chaudhary Shujat Hussain said the opposition could not give any proof about this conspiracy and wanted to make an issue out of nothing. He said many pamphlets were published about Mohajiristan [land of the Mohajirs] during the PPP [Pakistan People's Party] regime. They did not take any action. The credit goes to the present government that it banned the book on the subject when it was brought to its notice.

The interior minister said the opposition leader during her speech referred to press reports which have already been categorically denied by an army spokesman on the issue. He said army action was taken after the government gave its approval. He said it was the PPP which massacred innocent people during Pucca Qiala operation in Hyderabad and Mr. Mohammad Nawaz Sharif extended financial assistance to the victims.

He said after the publication of the Jinnahpur conspiracy map, the government held thorough inquiries and reached the conclusion that it was only a figment of imagination of the PPP as they wanted to create an issue and exploit it.

Earlier, the minister of state for labor and manpower, Mian Mohammad Zaman, said the PPP is criticizing the MQM [Mohajir Qaumi Movement] today but it entered into an agreement with the MQM when it needed their support after the 1988 elections.

Taking part in the discussion, the leader of the opposition, Benazir Bhutto Sahiba, said there had been and are many regional parties but none has described itself a nation except MQM. She said more than 50 percent of the top leadership of the MQM are illegal immigrants from India in the 1970's and 80's. She charged that first the MQM clashed with various communities and planned to create a separate province and then go for independence. She said that the hand of RAW [Research and Analysis Wing of India] is squarely visible in the conspiracy. Benazir Bhutto Sahiba said the PPP accord with MQM broke up when the PPP refused to accept their demand and release kidnappers and terrorists of MQM. She said they preferred national interest to personal interest and that PPP and PDA cannot compromise on supreme national interest.

Taking part in the discussion, Syed Pervez Ali Shah, PDA, spoke against various actions of MQM since its inception and called for the setting up a high-powered commission headed by a Supreme Court judge to inquire into the whole plan of Jinnahpur. Mr. Ajmal Khatak, ANP [Awami National Party], strongly criticized policies of PPP and said its leadership has all along been following double standards. Reiterating his party's firm belief in the integrity of Pakistan, he urged all political elements to join hands and work for greater collective good of the nation and the country.

The minister for industries, Sheikh Rashid Ahmed, said it goes to the credit of the present government that it took action against MQM. He said it was the PPP which first entered into an accord with the MQM when the PPP needed support to come to power. He said the prime minister empowered the army for Operation Cleanup in Sindh and FIR's [first information reports] have been registered against MQM leaders, including Altaf Husain. The minister assured the house that the government would not spare anybody working against the interests of the motherland. Raja Mohammad Zahir Khan, JI, strongly criticized the ethnic and linguistic organizations and activities of MQM which, he said, indulged in torture and killing of innocent people. He said the state should take bold action against such elements.

The house will meet again tomorrow morning.

Article Laments Lack of Leadership

93AS0104F Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 9 Oct 92 p 6

[Article by Syed Fahd Husain]

[Text] We have no real leaders. It would indeed be a Herculean task to deny this fact. One look at the Parliament proceedings and this point is driven home with a vengeance. This glaring national inadequacy has reached a level where a disgusted populace is slowly transforming into an indifferent one.

Pygmies rule this land of ours. This is not an astounding revelation but the recent visit of Nelson Mandela embarrassingly highlighted this serious deficiency in Pakistan. It was there for all to see: revered locals and (very) high members of our officialdom scurrying around the towering figure of the African leader, like excited kids. No one was there to match his stature, his charisma and his magnetic appeal. No one was there who could talk to him on an equal plane; who could rub shoulders with him and not be ridiculously paled in comparison. There was a yawning chasm which could not be filled by a million talking heads clad in waistcoats. A greater tragedy there never could be.

No doubt there is no shortage of good and competent corporate leaders and business managers. They however remain confined to their limited sectors, away from the glare of the public eye, content with boardroom meetings

and financial wheelings and dealings behind imposing closed doors. But they are no substitute for political leaders, for as Warren G. Bennis of the University of Southern California put it: "Managers have as their goal to do things right. Leaders have as their goal to do the right thing."

And Richard Nixon, former U.S. President wrote: "In a sense, management is prose; leadership is poetry... The manager thinks of today and tomorrow. The leader must think of the day after tomorrow. A manager represents a process. The leader represents a direction of history."

Here in Pakistan, if management is prose, leaders are illiterate. If the manager thinks of today and tomorrow, our leaders think of their wallets; and if a manager represents a process, leaders represent only their families and their narrow interests.

The disillusionment says it all. Just talk to any man in the street about our leadership and he will have nothing but disgust and scorn for them. In any roadside cafe and restaurant; in any office or drawing room, people complain about the hypocrisy, the corruption and the shamelessness of politicians and bureaucrats. Normal people in normal societies do not talk like this all the time. This in itself means that there is something really very wrong with the people at the top.

A sociologist would say these people are after all a product of the same society; therefore, it is society as a whole that should be blamed for producing such morons and not the morons themselves.

An economist would say it is the unequal distribution of wealth which has concentrated so much power in the hands of so few at the expense of the helpless poor majority.

A political scientist would say it is the initial phase of the evolution of a political entity which would, in the course of its growth, cast away this corroded crust at the top, to be replaced by fresh layers beneath.

But a common Pakistani says, "Hell, I don't care what these fancy theorists think. I only know that I am not being given what I had been promised in return for my vote. I don't feel I have any say in the system which means that my vote has no value, except for those who build fortunes on my misery. I only know one thing: I want these morons out."

All these people are right in their own respects, some more than the others. But for some strange reason, their views fail to have any impact on the body politic of Pakistan. The only feature that has become permanent in Pakistan is permanence itself.

Japan has a lack of oil, Russia has a lack of money, Somalia has lack of food, former Yugoslavia has a lack of peace, Americans have a lack of war. We, however, have a lack of vision. We have a lack of will to improve. And the moral values that we had are being torn asunder by the waistcoat clad morons.

The theories of over-qualified academics are valid for those who can understand them. An average Pakistani, on the other hand, expects basic decency from his/her leaders. That too is not afforded.

Some small facts which say a lot about the moral bankruptcy of the upper cadre, regardless of party affiliation: a VIP plane worth more than \$40 million is bought for the PM [Prime Minister]. Parliamentarians bicker, quarrel and sulk over the denial of their own petty privileges. Serious crises arise over the use of VIP lounges at airports. Some say their hearts bleed for the downtrodden but in the same breath, claim that they were "born to rule." And the same game goes on.

Strange. On the face of it, these people look normal, act normal. You run into a politician. You talk to him. You listen to him. He dresses well. Exudes civility and decorum. Talks about his kids, his family, his interests, his future plans, etc. All in all, someone who could be your run-of-the-mill neighbour.

Next day you read in the papers that he made a fool of himself because he was told he could not import a duty-free car. Or that he stood up on a rostrum and told the audience that Quran and Sunnah would be the supreme law of the land. And you know that only last night you saw him at a reception pounding drinks like a man possessed. Is this my leader, you ask? Is it people like he who claim to lead Pakistan, who say that if they were in power they would give us heaven itself. The vision shatters.

Simple economics. The demand for leaders is high because their supply is low. Prices have, therefore, gone up.

But how much are we willing to pay?

Commentary Advises Compromise With Opposition

93AS0109G Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English
22 Oct 92 p 7

[Article by Hazoor Ahmed Shah: "Why 'Positive and Unconditional Cooperation,' Why Not 'Reciprocal?'"]

[Text] In a country where power wielded in the name of democracy is tilted towards authoritarianism, to ask the Opposition to cooperate unconditionally is tantamount to saying "you surrender your right to dissent." Besides, when the Opposition has been concerned, should it not be expected to demand redress of the wrongs done to it before coming on to extend its cooperation to the party in power?

In any case a mere call for cooperation would hardly cut much ice. For a dialogue between the government and the opposition to be meaningful, a conducive atmosphere has to be first created because negotiation does not take place under duress or compulsion.

Moreover the offer, if sincere, is not publicised; spade work is done quietly, agenda for the government-opposition cooperation is prepared and then the respective leaders meet to give it (cooperation) a concrete shape.

Even if cooperation is agreed upon on reciprocal terms it would not mean that the right to dissent has been surrendered, for it is the Opposition's right to point to the administrative lapses and to demand redress on behalf of the aggrieved common people.

It is not the first time Prime Minister [PM] Nawaz Sharif has called for cooperation between the government and the opposition. However, it is the first time he has stressed that this cooperation should be "positive and unconditional."

The PM's offer has come not on the floor of the august House, but aboard his special plane while returning from his six-day visit to China. From the point of view of venue it compares not illogically with Gen Asif Nawaz's casual, but highly significant, statement during a diplomatic reception that "I have done my job (vide Operation Clean-up in Sindh) and I am ready to leave."

The onus for having political stability would have rested equitably with the government and the opposition if those in authority had shown extra-consideration and indulgence towards the opposition and the latter had responded positively and in a constructive manner.

But our politicians have a typical disposition to confront each other and to take things far enough, almost to a point of no return. And, when we do harm to national integrity and make the ground fertile for an adventurer to step in, we raise a hue and cry that democracy is not allowed to take its normal course and that the politicians are wilfully discredited.

As a matter of fact that democracy that we have is the Eighth Amendment-dominated and, therefore, a chained democracy. It doesn't matter if, instead of parliamentary democracy, we have the presidential form of government. What, however is important is that power should not be allowed to be concentrated in one person or one party, but that it should be shared by the collective wisdom of the elected representatives through an in-built mechanism of checks and balances.

For democracy to work in its true form and substance it is necessary that the Opposition should be taken into confidence and a consensus is sought to be developed on all major issues of national and international import. Unfortunately, however, in our democratic set-up the Opposition is totally alienated.

Benazir, when sacked, dubbed the President's action a "constitutional coup." But she now is demanding the same "coup" from the President on the same charges of corruption, inefficiency and maladministration that were levelled against her government. These charges she had hotly contested, but then she accepted the caretaker

government headed by Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi and participated in the elections conducted by the constitutionally valid election authority.

When the results came she protested vehemently and pronounced that the elections were heavily rigged. And when the National Assembly came into being, she called it an unrepresentative, even a bogus, body but, all the same, she has remained a vocal part of it. It is a different matter that she has threatened to resign from it at an "appropriate time" or that she wants its dissolution straightaway.

There is no denying that ever since her ouster as prime minister, Benazir has consistently been on the receiving end and her party, the PPP [Pakistan People's Party], has borne the brunt of victimisation at the hands of the late Jam Sadiq Ali and his overlords. The process of roping in the opposition MPAs [members of Provincial Assembly] under duress or through cajolery has not ended yet, though the thrust under Muzaffar Husain Shah is more towards the MQM [Mohajir Qaumi Movement] (Haq Parast) MPAs than it has been towards the PPP MPAs.

With the background one wonders what is it that is left to make way for reconciliation or as the PM prefers to say "positive and unconditional cooperation" between the government and the opposition. The Prime Minister says he has always offered unconditional cooperation to the Opposition in the hope that it would reciprocate because he believes that political stability was essential for economic progress. It is alright for the PM to seek no conditions as he is saddled in power, but does he expect the Opposition, which has been a victimised body, should have no condition attached to extending him its cooperation?

Benazir has come the long way of patient waiting to agree to anything short of the dissolution of the assemblies, formation of a neutral caretaker government and holding of fair and free elections under a new election authority with safeguards against rigging and other electoral malpractices and manipulations.

Call Benazir whatever you may from the government point of view, but the fact is she is not alone today in her opposition to Nawaz Sharif and his government. Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan, Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi, Nawab Bugti, Maulana Fazlur Rahman and Maulana Shah Ahmad Noorani are among the known stalwarts of all time who, in conjunction with Benazir Bhutto, have realised in no uncertain terms that only a change of the present set-up can stem the rot set in the body politic of today. And, once the nine-party IJI [Islami Jamhoori Ittehad] is now left with the worth-mentioning PML [Pakistan Muslim League] and its ally, the ANP (Awami National Party) which is confined to the NWFP [North-West Frontier Province] only.

Except for Balochistan, the entire countryside from Khyber to Karachi has been badly mauled by rain-cum-flood havoc. Nawaz Sharif's best care will be if he

ensures that the uprooted mass of electorate is provided with adequate relief and is rehabilitated properly without any distinction or discrimination. Besides, he takes care that the huge funds that are released by the government and the enormous financial and other assistance that is forthcoming from foreign sources are utilised strictly for the relief and rehabilitation purposes.

The task no doubt is challenging but on its successful implementation hinges the very future of the Nawaz Sharif government.

President, Politicians Alerted to 'Whispers'

93AS0109B Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English
21 Oct 92 p 6

[Article: "Daily Sensations and Daily Anti-Climaxes"]

[Text] The Pakistani press has, of late, been coming out with sensational disclosures about the acts of omission and commission of politicians and civil servants, almost daily. If most of these stories were not so full of substance, one would be seriously tempted to equate the national press with certain British tabloids but the national print media have proven to be head and shoulders above those rags. For quite some time now Operation Midnight Jackals has been in the limelight and shocking disclosures have been made while none of them have been denied by the principal figures involved. These are Federal Minister for Commerce Malik Naim Ahmed, DIB [Director of Intelligence Bureau] Chief Brig (Retd) Imtiaz Ahmad and Major (Retd) Aamir. According to certain audio cassettes made public by a PPP [Pakistan People's Party] Punjab leader, they had been conspiring to overthrow the government of Ms. Benazir Bhutto in late 1989 through a no-confidence motion to be engineered through horse-trading of the most shameless kind. There has been the appearance of a news item in a certain section of the press alleging the direct involvement of the present Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in the conspiracy. The Honourable Prime Minister, too, has considered this allegation too trivial to be denied. Whatever the outcome of a probe, if ordered into the conspiracy, may have been, the retired brigadier and the retired major, who were then both serving with the IJI [Islami Jamhoori Ittehad], were dismissed from service "on fault," since the evidence against them was not considered sufficient to justify a full court martial. Needless to say they escaped by the skin of their teeth on a mere technicality!

The latest disclosure in the Operation Midnight Jackals is that the relevant tapes found their way into Indian hands and their transcript has appeared in the INDIAN SUNDAY OBSERVER OF New Delhi. The shame of the disclosure is that the ISI [Information Service of India] itself is said to have allowed these tapes to have gone into the hands of a power which can by no means be termed as friendly. There is no denying the fact that these two disgraced Army officers, prima facie, have

been guilty of serious misdemeanours amounting perilously close to high treason. One, they conspired to overthrow a duly elected and duly appointed government; and, two, they leaked classified secrets both within and without the country. And there is sufficient evidence to indicate that the present Prime Minister, who was then the Chief Minister of the Punjab, was fully aware of their doings. To lend support to this theory is the fact that both Brig (Retd) Imtiaz Ahmed and Major (Retd) Aamir, were re-employed by Mr. Nawaz Sharif when he became Prime Minister as DIB Chief and FIA [Federal Investigations Agency] Customs Chief, the latter in the Punjab. Why would he wish to re-employ them if not as a reward for services rendered at some past time?

Federal Minister Malik Naim Ahmed, too, is, or should be, batting on a very weak wicket—if he should be batting at all. After all, conspiracy to overthrow a legitimate government falls foul of Article 6 of the Constitution of Pakistan and since he is accused of doing just that, he should have been the first to demand an inquiry to clear his position, after first resigning. Allegations such as have been made in this context are too serious to be allowed to go by the board. The Prime Minister is alleged to be personally involved. The President Ghulam Ishaq Khan has at long last ordered a high-level probe into the scandal. But it is not clear what exactly is to be the Scope of this probe. For far too long now we have let the favoured get away with blue murder while the less fortunate have been prosecuted for the most trivial of crimes. If the President can use the sweeping powers invested in him by the 8th Amendment to dismiss a central government and dissolve National and provincial assemblies, surely he can use them to clean the Augean Stables. As it is, there are so many whispers involving the person of the president that he had better do so forthwith, if he is not to give rise to more whispers.

Press Gallery Reports House's Fear of Martial Law

93AS0109D Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English
22 Oct 92 p 5

[Article by Mohammad Yasin: "Pervasive Fear of Martial Law"]

[Text] What kind of terrorism is the words—State terrorism or the individual terrorism? This was the line adopted by PDA's [People's Democratic Alliance] opening batsman Syed Iftikhar Gilani to counter the frontal attack of the Treasury Benches on the PPP [Pakistan People's Party] and its leaders while discussing the alleged terrorist activities of the Al-Zulfiqar Organisation in the course of two-day debate on the AZO [Al-Zulfiqar Organization] in the National Assembly.

Whenever some kind of agitation against the government is building up, it revives the AZO bogey to beat the parliamentary opposition with, though the PDA has all along denied its links with the AZO.

From the speeches made in the House today at least by two IJI [Islami Jamhoori Ittehad] stalwarts Defence Minister Ghaus Ali Shah and the Housing Minister Javed Hashmi, the impression that one got was that fear of the Martial Law was visibly pronounced in their speeches. In an obvious reference to the attempts by the opposition parties to forge alliance against the government and initiate a movement against it, Ghaus Ali Shah repeatedly decried the activities of the politicians who were trying to dislodge the system by collaborating with the handful of politicians who have negligible following in the public. Twice did he talk of the Martial Law saying that it had always been brought due to the constant tussle amongst the politicians. He sounded a note of warning to the opposition parties warning them that Martial Law never comes for days. "It is for years and years," he said.

Repeatedly did he talk of saving the system. The Defence Minister said those who talked of the Martial Law were no friends of the country.

From Ghaus Ali Shah's pronouncements it appeared that the Government had raised the issue of the AZO in the House on the realisation that the opposition was not interested in sorting out matters in the House but it was more interested in dislodging the government by forging alliances outside the House. Said he: "we had avoided bringing up the issue of AZO in the House to avoid creating acrimony." Now that the Chief of the AZO Mir Murtaza Bhutto has confessed to being the father of the AZO and its activities, he said, there is no option with the government but to put the issue before the House. The Minister held the AZO responsible for the terrorist activities in Pakistan. Unlike other Ministers, Syed Ghaus Ali Shah talked on the issue reasonably without getting excited or provoked. He was repetitive in his speech. And his speech was listened to in pin-drop silence by the opposition.

Ch Shujaat Hussain in his speech tried to prove linkages of the PPP with AZO. He referred to giving a post of Grade 20 to the poetess Fahmida Riaz who had remained in self-exile in New Delhi. One could not understand by what stretch of imagination he was trying to provide links of the poetess Fahmida Riaz to AZO. Well, the poetry is not the field the poor ministers of this government can understand, commented a cynic in the cafeteria.

Javed Hashmi is another specialist in AZO and he brought with him in the House a bundleful of photo stat copies of the documents to prove the linkages of the AZO with Indians and their involvement in terrorist activities. He displayed much temper in the debate in his usual style reminiscent of the student days. But all that he proved was that he could take on his political foes with the same passion as he used to do in his university days. Then he read excerpts from the letters of Shah Nawaz Bhutto to prove the Bhutto family's contempt for the army personnel.

Syed Iftikhar Gilani was at his best today. Like a true lawyer, he made a hash of the IJI stalwarts' attack on the PDA. He said the PPP did not believe in terrorism. Even during his confinement in death cell of the Rawalpindi jail, Z.A. Bhutto never gave a call for taking arms for his sake. The PPP, he said, had no truck with AZO or any terrorists organisation. How could the people who have stood up to state terrorism during the Martial Law of Gen Zia, have any kind of linkages with individual terrorism? He countered the accusation of the Defence Minister that the politicians are responsible for the imposition of the Martial Law. "The politicians are not responsible for the imposition of the Martial Law but only the stooges are." Pointing to the Treasury benches, he said that if the Martial Law were to be imposed in Pakistan, those sitting on the Treasury Benches would be the ones to take oath under it. The PDA opposition was hounded during the Martial Law and is continued to be hounded under the present government, he said.

He said if the AZO was terrorist organisation, why the government had failed to file cases against the people involved in the AZO. He said the State terrorism had given birth to the individual terrorism. The PDA, he said, was not in the dock. Gilani had a dig at the government for having a DIB [Director of Intelligence Bureau] Chief who was sacked by the army.

The leader of the opposition Ms. Bhutto sat in the House for one hour waiting for the debate to resume but the whole time was consumed on other issues. When BB [Benazir Bhutto] was about to leave the House, the Speaker enquired from her if she would take part in the debate. Benazir Bhutto was quick to remark that she had to go to Lahore to keep an appointment. She said she waited in the House for the PM [Prime Minister] for one hour but the Prime Minister did not think the debate in the House was important enough to warrant his presence there.

In the absence of the Prime Minister, his younger brother Shahbaz Sharif—the Bobby—sat throughout the sitting. He kept shuttling from bench to bench, giving points to the expected participants in the debate. During debate, the former Prime Minister Mohammad Khan Junejo walked up straight to the front seat and occupied a seat close of Hamid Nasir Chatha. Usually he occupies back seat.

The minority MNAs [members of National Assembly] on both sides of the House displayed rare unity over the failure of the PTV to give coverage to their meeting with the Minority Affairs Minister regarding the ID cards controversy. The MNAs belonging to Minorities were furious that the government took a decision on the ID cards in a hurry without consulting them. They described it against the spirit of the pronouncements of the Quaid-i Azam.

General Beg Recommends Withdrawing Army From Sindh

93AS0109E Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English
22 Oct 92 p 5

[Article: "Army Should Withdraw From Sindh: Gen Beg"]

[Text] Karachi, Oct 21: Gen Mirza Aslam Beg former Army Chief, said here at a press conference on Wednesday night, he was ready to testify before the judicial commission, probing the death of late Gen Ziaul Haq and eight of his senior military colleagues in the Bahawalpur air crash.

He said he did not want to say anything more for the present for he had been explaining his conduct in the tragedy of August 1988, but if some people kept suspecting his involvement in the accident, he could not help it, he said.

General Beg drew solace from the fact that the credentials of those insinuating against him, were too well known to be heeded.

One of them Akram Awan, was an air force defector, facing 14-year jail term, while the other (Grig Siddique Salek's son) was at liberty to express his opinion. The two had held Gen Beg responsible for Zia's death.

Gen Beg said a calculated attempt was being made to defame him but since his hands were clean, he had nothing to worry or hide skeletons in the cupboard.

Luckily, his image in the army which he commanded for three years, had remained untarnished which was reflected from a rebuttal of the charge of the defence Minister and for which he felt gratified.

Answering questions, Gen Beg dilated on an earlier lecture on army's role in a developing country, to share views that politicians were equally responsible for drawing army into politics. He could say from personal experience what kind of pressures he had to encounter at the time of President Ziaul Haq's death or soon afterwards. He had to cold shoulder suggestions about delaying elections in the country. Those advising him against restoration of democracy, sought shelter behind a disturbed Sindh situation but he shrugged off all such advices and held two successive elections within a span of two years. Politicians, he remarked often pampered the generals which was not required.

Gen Beg said that while army had done a remarkable job in Sindh, it should pull back to barracks, for its longer stay would cause complications. The specialised Mehran force with army's command, control, and logistic back up would prove an effective replacement for combat troops. He said there was no harm in holding elections in Sindh.

Gen Beg disagreed that army's involvement in civilian duties would reflect on its professional training, and explained that a limited force was assigned martial law duties.

However, since Sindh operation necessitated committing nearly three divisions of infantry manpower, it would affect troops combativeness. A questioner wanted to know whether increasing waistlines of our senior army officers demonstrated their neglect from primary assignment, General Beg recalled that the force under his command had set standards of physical fitness. If today, some television cameras showed healthier officers, it would be the fault of TV crew.

He also dismissed suggestions that the army was running a parallel government in Sindh. Army had acted under civilian government directive. However, some lack of understanding between soldiers and the Sindh government may have generated such an impression.

Benazir Says Army Operations in Sindh Curtailed

93AS0104A Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English
9 Oct 92 pp 1, 4

[Article by Mohammad Saleh Zaafr; quotation marks as published]

[Text] Islamabad, Oct 8—Benazir Bhutto, former prime minister and Leader of the Opposition in the National Assembly, said here on Thursday that the situation in Sindh might get worse after army's withdrawal from the province.

"The military operation could not take an independent course in Sindh rather the army worked on the directions of the Provincial Operation Committee, headed by the Provincial Chief Minister," Benazir Bhutto said.

The PPP [Pakistan People's Party] Co-chairperson was talking to a group of journalists in her parliament chamber this afternoon before leaving for Lahore. She asked "how long the army can play the role of a policeman in Sindh."

Terming the scenario in Sindh like a "Catch 22" situation, she said the army was not given a free hand and this explained why the big fish remained untouched.

The former prime minister said there was no doubt that the crime rate had come down in Sindh. But the army she said could not deliver the political, social, and economic package. This was the obligation of the civilian government, she said.

Benazir Bhutto said she was opposed to giving the army powers under Article 245, but added that it was strange that the army could not try those outlaws who were rounded up during the operation. She said the corrupt officials of police, administration and judiciary in Sindh should have been sacked to ensure smooth functioning in future.

The leader of the Opposition also lauded army role during the flood. "The army was denied coverage by official media deliberately," she charged.

Benazir Bhutto said the image of the army among the Sindhis had now undergone a change. The army image under Gen Zia, who used it for his personal end, she said was tarnished.

Stressing a socio-economic package for the province, Benazir Bhutto said, the left and right bank canal projects should be completed immediately. It would improve the irrigation network and create more jobs. Referring to the "political vacuum" in Karachi and Hyderabad, she demanded a political settlement. She said the intelligentsia and certain political quarters in Sindh regard the MQM [Mohajir Qaumi Movement] Haqiqi as the creation of the government and were reluctant to accept it.

To a question Benazir Bhutto said, Pakistan People's Party (PPP) would see how the post-operation MQM act which earlier tortured the PPP workers. Describing Sayed Muzaffar Hussain Shah, Chief Minister Sindh as a bright and nice man, she said the problem was that he lacked political vision and popular support.

Benazir Bhutto said Sindh required fresh elections under a neutral government, so people could erect their own government through their votes.

She sharply criticised the announcement of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif regarding donations for Sindh. "He announced Rs [Rupees] 10 billion earlier then again Rs 5 billion but a very small portion of it had reached Sindh," she said.

JAVED SYED FROM LAHORE ADDS: Later talking to newsmen at the Lahore Airport Benazir Bhutto blamed Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif for making attempts to destroy national institutions including the armed forces, civil bureaucracy, intelligence agencies and the democratic institutions in order to establish dictatorship.

Benazir Bhutto who reached Lahore on Thursday afternoon to attend the wedding ceremony of the son of PPP leader Ahmad Saeed, was talking to reporters at the Lahore Airport.

Supporting her allegations against the Premier, Ms. Bhutto added that at present the IJI [Islami Jamhoori Ittehad] was being controlled by the IB [Intelligence Bureau] chief and all postings, transfers and assignments in the ISI [Inter-Service Intelligence] were being affected by the IB. She further revealed that the ISI head was a relative of the IB chief. She said such state of affairs in the intelligence agencies could jeopardise national security.

Talking of Nawaz Sharif's dealing with bureaucracy, she said the Prime Minister was victimising those senior bureaucrats who abide by the rules. She cited Dr. Arshad who was forced to resign from the Planning Commission

because he refused to draw economic policies which suited the rulers. Without giving their names she feared that three more senior bureaucrats may be sacked in near future.

She said the foreign experts had advised the government to privatise the telecommunication system in phases. But she alleged the Prime Minister was in a hurry to privatise the tele-communication system to get enormous kickbacks.

Similarly, she said the IJI government had a negative thinking about the armed forces. She referred to 'Takbeer' which defamed the army officers with reference to C-130 air crash. But the government did not bother to refute the charges against the army. But when a poem was published in a newspaper against the Prime Minister the newspaper was charged with sedition. She said since the Nawaz government came in power the law and order situation in all four provinces had gone from bad to worse.

She regretted that recently the brother of Lateef Afridi, the Chief of the Pakhtoon Khawa Party, was brutally murdered. She also referred to a number of assassinations in all the four provinces to substantiate her claim.

Shifting Political Coalitions in Balochistan Examined

93AS0065G Lahore *THE NATION* in English
25 Sep 92 p 5

[Article by Mansoor Akbar Kundi: "Changing Partners in Balochistan"; italicized words as published]

[Text] The recent political changes in the Balochistan coalition government are regarded a watershed in Balochistan's future politics. The major change came when the Pakhtoonkhwa Milli Awami Party (PMAP) decided to support the government policies by joining the coalition, having buried the hatchet with rival groups in the government. The Jamiat-i-Ulema-i-Islam (JUI-F), the third largest group in the Legislature which had resented the changes but was believed to have carried on with Mr. Jamali Ministry, finally quitted the cabinet.

The Balochistan Government was formed as a multi-party coalition under Taj Mohammad Jamali, the major interest of all those joining it being to keep Nawab Akbar Bugti's Jamhoori Watan Party (JWP), which has the largest representation of 12 seats and one independent MPA's [member of Provincial Assembly] support, from coming into power again. The PMAP, having three seats in the Assembly, didn't join the coalition but voted against Bugti. The only party to have supported the JWP was the Balochistan National Movement (BNM), which had only two seats.

The Jamali government, which had adopted a policy of reconciliation and appeasement from the very start of the alliance, rewarded everyone joining the government, regardless of their party affiliations with a ministry (to

many of their choice) or advisorship. Even the Peoples Democratic Alliance (PDA), with three seats, got two ministries and one advisorship in defiance of the overall IJI-PDA [Islami Jamhoori Ittehad-People's Democratic Alliance] opposition. Baz Mohammad Khetran, who was a probable minister, became an advisor. Immediate support came to the IJI from the Pakistan National Party (PNP) with five seats and one independent's support, and the JUI having six MPAs. The PNP, however, remained influential in the cabinet's decision-making. The IJI, which had seven seats in the Assembly and the support of two independent MPAs, claimed a majority of 24 out of a House of 43. All the IJI members and the independents supporting it became ministers or advisors.

The conciliatory policy of Mr. Jamali's government, where everyone reaped benefits with less restraint on his powers, unlike the previous government of Nawab Bugti, won support for the alliance from all the partners. Later on, two other MPAs from the JWP joined the coalition, giving a blow to JWP's opposition stunt, and were made ministers. Even at the cost of alliance partners' differences over the reshuffling of portfolios, a change was made possible, including the raising of a new ministry, the Ministry of Prisons, for Fateh Ali Umrani. The portfolio was later allotted to JUI's candidate, Maulana Amir Zaman. At this juncture, when the induction of new ministers appeared to strengthen the Jamali government, many leading ministers developed differences with JUI which had refused to accept changes in their ministries. The JUI compared to others, was in the beginning more demanding in its choice ministries and speakership. They had the important Ministries of Food, Agriculture, Planning and Development and Public Health.

The major resistance to JUI came from the PNP and its supporters in the Assembly. They criticised the JUI for misusing government funds for party programmes and Zakat funds for strengthening party-supported *madrasas*. The PMAP, traditionally a JUI rival in Pushtu-speaking areas, endorsed the PNP opposition to JUI, even in the wake of growing differences between PNP and PMAP over the controversial issues of the Mastung Agricultural College and Quetta Municipal Corporation elections where they actively mobilised support of their parties for the rights of ethnic groups. The PNP and PMAP, both the left-wing parties in the Baloch and Pathan belts, respectively, have come closer and believe to make a triangular alliance with the PDA.

The recent changes in PMAP's policies made it bury hatchet with its opponents except JUI. The PMAP, a left-wing political party, is rooted in the Pushtu-speaking areas of Quetta, Zhob and Sibi divisions. The party, having supported the Saur revolution of Afghanistan and perceived its glorification across the borders, received a setback on changes in Afghanistan. The PMAP, which claimed the promotion of Pathans' rights in Balochistan and all over, appeared less mobilised in its pressure on the government for development funds in their areas.

They were believed to have come under criticism from many corners for not supporting the government, unlike the JUI, to fetch funds and approval of schemes. The PMAP was offered ministries when the Jamali government took office but the offer was made of a time when it believe that joining the government would not only be contrary to its political stand but also weaken its goals. It decided to be in opposition rather than have a share in the government. It, however, kept away from the overall opposition alliance of JWP and BNM, primarily because of its past opposition to the Nawab Ministry.

The ongoing differences among partners in the government, apparently, arose over the reallocation of portfolios, though the JUI was bitter over the PMAP's joining the government and appeared stubbornly opposed to Jamali's initiation of changes in the cabinet. Those in IJI, PNP and PDA were not happy over the changes in their favourite ministries. It was speculated that they all supported Jamali in ousting JUI and its replacement with PMAP and two more JWP candidates interested in ministries. But M. Jamali defied any replacement of JUI unless they walked out of the government. The JUI, while having differences with the PMAP, also perceived more concessions for the latter in case it resigned from the cabinet.

The PMAP's joining the government is generally supported by different sections of people as it might mitigate the growing ethnic tension in the province. The PMAP's resistance to many of the government actions were believed to have frustrated its demands, for developments in their areas. The party, having been supported by Pushtu-speaking people, could mobilise support against any action of the government over an issue where Pathans' interests were ignored. The PMAP has been militantly opposing the government's policies which it thought were against the Pathans' interests.

Similarly, other than JUI, many ministers and advisors seem to have been provoked by the changes and expansion in the cabinet.

All political parties joining the Balochistan coalition government had vested interests except the JWP, BNM and PMAP. The number of ministries, including speakership, deputy speakership and MPA advisors, had reached 24, and could reach 30 if JUI had not left the government.

The challenges in Balochistan seem to have restructured party relationship in and outside the coalition government. The JUI was a strong, reliable supporter of Mr. Jamali, and Mr. Jamali made last-hour plea to retain them in the cabinet. The JUI alliance with JWP-BNM can pose a possible vote of no-confidence if Mr. Bugti succeeds in winning the support of some of members inside the government for a bigger share in power in the new coalition. Also, there is a possibility that Mr. Jamali, to strengthen his position, may entice a few more MPAs from JWP offering them ministerships. But after the recent changes the possibility is not much.

DMG: NA Informed of Nepotistic Induction Policy*93AS0104B Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English
9 Oct 92 p 1*

[Article by Mohammad Yasin]

[Text] Islamabad, Oct 8—The National Assembly was informed on Thursday by the Minister Incharge Establishment that a total number of 26 Armed Forces officers have been inducted into the District Management Group [DMG] from Oct 1, 1990 to Sept 30, 1992 by the present government.

The minister admitted that three army officers were inducted into the civil service in relaxation of the induction policy duly approved by the Prime Minister.

Among the three officers is the former Military Secretaries to Prime Minister Mohammad Nawaz Sharif, Brig Mohammad Nizar, who was appointed Director General in the Foreign Office. Two others are Lt Col Iftikhar-ur-Rehman and Lt Col Abdul Latif. Lt Col Iftikhar-ur-Rehman is working as Deputy Secretary Cabinet Division and Lt Col Abdul Latif as a Director Foreign Office.

Federal Minister for Agriculture and Food, Lt Gen (Retd) Majid Malik's son Major Qaiser Majid Malik was inducted into DMG on August 8 last year in Grade 18. He is now training at the Civil Service Academy Lahore. According to the remarks against his name, it has been reported that he was inducted into DMG according to the induction policy.

The newspapers had reported in August last year that the Minister had requested the Prime Minister to approve his son's induction in DMG. THE MUSLIM in its issue dated August 25, 1991 had reproduced the letter written by Lt Gen Majid Malik to the Prime Minister. The minister had stated in his letter: "I had earlier requested that my son Capt Qaiser Majid Malik AMC may please be inducted into the DMG against the Armed Services quota. You had graciously accepted my request and order that the induction would take place at an appropriate time. It is submitted that my son has since been promoted to the rank of Major. His name has already been forwarded by the GHQ [General Headquarters] to the Ministry of Defence for the appropriate induction. The government has nominated some majors in the DMG recently. It is requested that my son may please be nominated as a Major in the DMG and he be allowed to attend the special training course commencing in August 1991."

Another conspicuous name in the list of the inductees is that of Capt Mohammad Safdar. He has been inducted into DMG in July 1992. He is now under training in the CSA [Civil Service Academy] Lahore. He has served as ADC [Aide-de-Camp] to the former Prime Minister Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi as well as Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif.

The other army officers inducted into the Civil Service are: Capt Munir Azam, Capt Javed Akbar, Capt Munir Ahmed Pahore, Flt Lt Daud Ahmed, Lt Khalid Mahmood, Capt Usman Zakria, Capt Allah Warrayo, Lt Tayyab Saeed, Lt Raja Ali Ejaz, Capt Muhammad Hassan, Flt Lt Afzal Mahmood, Capt Saeed Ahmed Khan, Capt Sikandar Qayyum, Capt Rizwan Khan Tareen, Capt Najeeb Durrani, Major Rizwanullah, Maj Azam Suleman Khan, Sqn Ldr Abid Ali, Sqd Ldr M Irfan Elahi, Sqn Ldr Amjad Ali Toor and Major Syed Ibne Hussain.

Mazdoor Kissan Party Supports Reviving Socialism*93AS0104E Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English
9 Oct 92 p 5*

[Text] Peshawar, Oct 8—Capitalism during its 400 years of rule has given nothing but wars, injustice, deprivations, exploitations and atrocities that is why it cannot be the fate of the world. Socialism, on the other hand, was the only way of the emancipation of the deprived, suppressed and working classes, which could be temporarily defeated, but its triumphs cannot be over ruled.

This was the gist of the speeches delivered at two day congress of Mazdoor Kissan Party (MKP), Pukhtoonkhwa, at Nishtar hall Peshawar.

The speakers included Central President of PMKP [Pakistan Mazdoor Kissan Party], Ghulam Nabi Kullo, as Chief Guest, Provincial President Agha Habibur Rehman, General Secretary Punjab Tanzeem Asgha Khan, the Chief of Dehati Mazdoor Panjab, Agha Dula, the President of Bhatta Mazdoor Mahaz Anwar Bhatti, the Provincial Secretary PPP [Pakistan People's Party] Muzaffar Shah, communist party Salim Raz, Tahreek-e-Istiglal Umar Asghar Khan, and Afzal Khamosh.

A large-number of workers of the aforementioned parties also participated which displayed red colour in their caps, badges and flags besides, their ultimate faith in socialism, in the jam-packed Nishtar hall on both the two days.

The President Mazdoor Kissan Party, Ghulam Nabi Kullo called upon the world labour community to come out and forge unity amongst them against the imperialistic designs under the umbrella of U.S.-sponsored New World Order.

He was addressing the Pakistan Mazdoor Kissan Party Provincial Congress held here at Nishtar hall on Thursday.

Alleging the present government, he said that it was working as an agent for the western imperialism and was confined to its vested interests.

Expressing his views upon the recent devastation caused by the torrential rains and floods, he said that government was spending million of rupees on projecting the

rosy picture through mass media, but in fact the flood affected people were not provided any kind of relief.

Bitterly criticising the mass media, he remarked that it only worked for providing pleasures. He also demanded an immediate release of political prisoners including Asif Ali Zardari, MNA [Member of National Assembly] and husband of the leader of the opposition.

Stressing upon the importance of socialism, he said it represents 90 percent of the entire world population.

He also said that industrialists and feudal lords were enjoying luxurious life while the working class was deprived of the basic necessities of life. He also demanded an immediate solution of unemployment problem in the country.

The PDA [People's Democratic Alliance], provincial leader Syed Muzaffar Shah lashing at the present government said that it was exploiting the poor masses and was not sincere in solving their problems.

The leader of Tehreek-e-Istiglal, Umer Asghar Khan in his address said that country was presently being ruled over by drug and timber mafia. He bitterly criticised clean-up operation in Sindh.

He also expressed his deep concern over the ruthless deforestation in Kaghan Valley at the hands of what he termed the timber mafia.

He further said that according to World Bank's latest report about six lakh children died during the current year due to non-provision of drinking water, but government took no notice in this regard. Expressing his views upon the recent flood devastation, he said all this happened due to government's negligence.

The speakers vowed to continue their struggle and bitterly criticised the aggressive attitude of the imperialist forces led by the United States and called upon the smaller nations to unite against such aggressions.

On the concluding of the 2nd day, elections to the Provincial Cabinet for the next three years were also held. Agha Habibur Rehman Hazaravi was elected as President, while Murtaza Khan, Vice President 1st, Haji Akram, Vice President 2nd, Hal Rahman Babo, General Secretary, Jamroz Khan Joint Secretary, Arif Shah Press Secretary, Zeer Gul, Treasurer, Fazal Manan, Salar and Sheer Bahader Vice Salar were also elected.

The elections were followed by a cultural show, which was participate, like the past, by all the groups.

Analyst Argues Against Repatriation of Biharis

93AS0065E Lahore THE NATION in English
23 Sep 92 p 7

[Article by Abbas Rashid: "The Bihari Issue"; quotation marks as published]

[Text] Among the more vexing questions faced by Pakistan, and a potentially explosive one, is that of the repatriation of Biharis—sometimes referred to as stranded Pakistanis—from Bangladesh. The total number of the people involved is a quarter of a million and the first batch of 3,000 families, according to a government decision, are scheduled to be flown in later this year. Under an agreement in the early 70's, a substantial number of Biharis who opted for Pakistan were allowed to settle down here. A large number remained in the camps in Bangladesh refusing to integrate in that society and unable to make it to the country of their preference. Nevertheless as a consequence of the process of illegal immigration, Pakistan amended its citizenship law in 1978 refusing to accept as citizens all those whose repatriation had not been specifically agreed to under the 1973 agreement. Subsequently, the issue of Biharis repatriation was revived by the Zia regime while the Benazir government kept the matter under consideration, albeit, without much enthusiasm. Now, the decision to fly in the first batch of Bihari families and settle them in the Punjab is inevitably going to revive the tension existing on this issue.

A seminar on "Repatriation of Biharis" organised by a local English Daily in Lahore, Sunday, was indicative of the Sindhis anger and dismay at the proposed move. Sindhis almost all the speakers from Sindh they maintained, were being turned into a minority in their own province. There was extensive internal migration to Karachi as well as illegal migration from Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Bangladesh, etc. and bringing in the Biharis would absolutely be the last straw. Rasul Baksh Palejo of the Awami Tehrik while accurately identifying the many wrongs inflicted on Sindh by the Centre over the years came close to presenting a racist argument against the Biharis who, it was implied, just basically had something wrong with them. We are, of course, not entirely new to the phenomenon of this kind of blanket condemnation of an entire community or group. In another context, the Ahmadis are a case in point. Nevertheless, it is useful to keep in mind that Palejo's sentiments may be shared, unfortunately, by an increasing number of Sindhis.

On the other hand, not much is gained by arguments such as the one presented by the self-styled 'Khaki spun' ideologue Lt.-Gen. (Retd) Hammed Qul who airily dismissed the case against the Biharis repatriation by declaring that in keeping with its origins, Pakistan had to decide on the issue in line with its ideological aspirations and that factors such as the economic were of no consequence. Guiding the nation along the ideological path is not the task of generals, either serving or retired. In any case as Palejo was quick to point out, if the Muslim nexus is critical, why should not the Biharis continue to live among the people of Bangladesh, who were fellow Muslims. Another argument in favour of repatriation was articulated by Mujibur Rehman Shami, implicitly, within a framework of virtually complete autonomy. Who is Sindh to tell Punjab not to repatriate Biharis? As a speaker pointed out, it was for the Centre to take a decision on such matters.

Indeed it is dangerous for the Punjab to suggest that the province is free to decide on questions such as who is a citizen and who is not. It is not just a matter of being sensitive to the concerns of other provinces but of the grave implications for the federation of such an approach. Jam Saqi argued that after the separation of Bangladesh in 1971, we are no longer living in the Pakistan created in 1947 and the process of reformulating the relationships among its peoples had begun. The new Constitution of 1973 was a step in this direction, based as it was on a national consensus. His was the 'conspiratorial' view that Sindh had been punished for its democratic struggle in 1983 and 1986 when resistance in Sindh's rural areas was met with brutal repression by the Zia regime. As a long-term measure, Jam Saqi argued that the establishment had decided on the strengthening of the nonlocal population by increasing their numbers as well as arming them so as to neutralise the local population. Khalid Ahmad, editor, FRONTIER POST, looking at the issue in broadly humanitarian terms sought a consensus to back the decision already taken by the government to repatriate the Biharis. As he pointed out it was the government which before taking the final decision, should have carried out the exercise of building a consensus on this extremely sensitive and volatile issue. True to form, however, the government did not deem it necessary to send even a single representative to the seminar. Nasim Zehra sought to move the focus on to the larger Sindh crisis and Islamabad's role in it. She recognised the moral and perhaps legal obligation on the part of the government to bring the Biharis to Pakistan but was equally mindful of the explosive situation in Sindh and the possible disastrous consequences of the move. Aitzaz Ahsan spoke roughly in the same vein arguing that the planned flights to bring in the Biharis be put on hold till such time that there was a consensus in the country over the issue. Meanwhile, perhaps the Biharis could be given 'protected' status in Bangladesh, by Pakistan.

The preceding arguments as well as those made by others who spoke at the seminar including Yousaf Leghari, Haseeb Hashmi, Prof. Rasheed, Abdullah Malik, Prof. Azizuddin, Amir Khan and Malik Ghulam Nabi essentially comprised three positions. There were those who rejected outright the claim of Biharis to be Pakistani citizens. Some saw in the move more a conspiracy against Sindh rather than a concern for the Bihari plight. At the other end of the spectrum were the ideologues who saw absolutely no impediment to bringing the Biharis back. In between were those who felt that the Biharis ought to be brought back but in view of the implications in the context of the polarisation on the issue the move should be delayed.

The case for bringing the Biharis to Pakistan and for not doing so was best articulated by Prof. Eqbal Ahmad and Abdul Hafeez Pirzada, respectively. Eqbal's argument centred on two points. First, the numbers. Two and a half lacks, he said, was equivalent to the increase in the population of Pakistan per month, perhaps less. Why

should it be made into such an issue. More importantly, he argued, the Biharis were clearly Pakistani citizens and the state now had no right to deny them citizenship. The Bihari issue had become a symbol of all kind of things including the worst kind of injustices suffered by Sindh at the hands of the Centre and that there was a large gap between perception and reality on this issue which did not bode well for an enlightened approach. Pirzada was in partial agreement, but, he argued, such was the state of affairs. There was 6 percent literacy in rural Sindh, its economy was in shambles, it was run by the people who did not represent it and despite the massive army presence matters were far from being resolved in either urban or rural Sindh, Sindh then was already precariously balanced and the arrival of the Biharis could prove to be the last straw. Pirzada effectively countered the argument that the Biharis were coming to the Punjab and would not go to Sindh. How would you stop them, he asked. As citizens of Pakistan, they would have a perfect right to go to any part of the country that they wanted. They would come to Sindh and it would not help matters. Instead of building bridges and allowing for a process of normalisation in Sindh, this would amount to the worst kind of provocation.

So, there it is. The chickens have indeed come home to roost. After years of Martial Law rule, the brutal repression of the Sindhis struggle for their legitimate democratic rights, the hanging of an elected Sindhi Prime Minister, the dismissal of elected governments, the manipulation of Sindh's people and its politics through intelligence agencies such is the level of suspicion and distrust in a province that now stands deeply divided that the two and a half lac Biharis have become a critical issue for a nation of more than a 110 million. If the Biharis are indeed, legally, citizens of Pakistan it poses the rather fundamental question; what kind of a state would refuse to acknowledge its own citizens? Perhaps their arrival could be delayed to allow a process of normalisation to take root in Sindh. But is there anything in the policies of the Centre and its blatantly manipulative approach to the political realities of Sindh that would suggest even vaguely that it was interested in such a process. Unfortunately, the answer is still no.

Political Coalition in Balochistan Examined

Coalition To Remain

93AS0060A Lahore NAWA-I-WAQT in Urdu 19 Sep 92 p 12

[Article by Aziz Bhatti: "No Danger of Losing Majority After JUI Split"]

[Text] The portfolios of Balochistan's ministers have again been reshuffled in order to allow all three of the provincial members of the Pakhtoonkhwa Milli Awami party to be included in the provincial cabinet. The ministry portfolios were reshuffled earlier on 19 August 1992, and were reshuffled again 27 days later on 5 September. Out of the 43 members of the Balochistan

assembly, 26 are cabinet ministers; the number of cabinet ministers increases to 29 if the chief minister, the speaker, and deputy speaker are also included; thus, all parties of the coalition government hold public or parliamentary posts, with the exception of one PDA [People's Democratic Alliance] member. There are 13 opposition members who are not in the government; the opposition party has two branches; Jamhoori Watan Party [JWP], which has 11 members, one of whom is an independent, while the Balochistan National Movement has two members, who, although they call themselves the opposition, nevertheless do not sit with the JWP in the assembly. Mir Taj Mohammad Jamali, chief minister of Balochistan, is forced to give equal privileges and public ranks to his colleagues because he heads the coalition government of five parties. Providing government and assembly appointments to two thirds of the assembly members has undoubtedly increased expenditures, but the chief minister has paid greater attention to increasing the province's financial resources rather than focussing on expenditures. For the first time in history, the chief minister has obtained such an amount of financial help from the Federal Government on the basis of "merit" as to dwarf by comparison the sums spent on ministers. By his special method of procedure and policy, Taj Mohammad Jamali has imperceptibly created his own strong political group, which will not only prove effective but will also play an important part in the future parliamentary politics of the province. This "nameless" group can no longer be ignored in Balochistan's politics. Rather than follow the example of any particular idealistic figure in politics, Jamali has adopted a novel course, and it is possible that he may himself be imitated by future politicians. People in general approve of Jamali's policies, but members of a particular circle are critical of him. At any rate, it will be difficult to abandon the political groundwork laid down by Jamali. It has never been easy to act in consensus, but Jamali has set an example of how it can be done.

The reshuffling of ministerial portfolios displeased some of the ministers in the beginning, but now more seem to have become discontented. It appears that Jamali has decided that he will not oust any minister or party from his government, but if they should choose to leave, he will not persuade them to stay. In the present situation, even if one or two parties should decide to leave the government, the chief minister will retain a clear majority of support in the assembly; hence, before leaving the cabinet, a party will have to give careful thought to the advantage or disadvantage of such a move.

We shall now review the changes brought about by the recent reshuffling of the ministry portfolios. Out of the 26 members of the provincial cabinet, eight ministers have not had their portfolios changed at any time. These are Haji Mohammad Shah Murdan Zai, Muslim League (JI), who is in charge of Social Welfare, Zakat, Ashr, and Endowments; Sheikh Jafar Khan Mandukheel, Education; Saleh Mohammad Bhutani, Industries; Shahzada

Jam Ali Akbar, Forests; Sardar Sanaullah Zahri of the Pakistan National Party, Municipalities; Jamiati-Ulema-i-Islam's Maulana Abdul Ghafur Haidari, Public Health, Engineering; People's Party PDA's Haji Nur Mohammad Saraf, Urban Development and WASAQDA [as published]; Master Johnson Ashraf, Minority Affairs, Public Welfare; also, Mir Jan Mohammad Jamali, Information, Culture, Sports Liaison; he still heads the same departments he had prior to August 19. Earlier, the Muslim League's Saeed Ahmad Hashmi headed the Information Department for a time but the department was returned to Mir Jan Jamali. Saeed Hashemi has remained in charge of Legal and Parliamentary Affairs from the very beginning; however, for short periods of time, he has also headed the Services and General Administration and Labor and Manpower departments. In the past administration, he was minister of agriculture; now he is in charge of Legal and Parliamentary Affairs. At the time when Chief Minister Jamali was considering reshuffling the ministerial portfolios, Saeed Hashemi, who is the provincial general secretary of the Muslim League, said in a statement that if the chief minister so desired, he was ready not only to relinquish his department but his ministry as well and that he would continue to support the chief minister in his capacity as a general member of the assembly. The chief minister welcomed his statement. Four of the ministers had their portfolios changed on 19 August, but on 5 September they were back in charge of the same departments. These ministers include Nawab Zulfiqar Ali Magasi of the Muslim League (JI) Interior and Malik Sarwar Khan Kakar (Communications and Construction); PNP's [Pakistan National Party] Nawab Mohammad Aslam Raisani (Treasury) and Mir Mohammad Aslam Bazanju (Labor and Manpower).

The departments given to the members of the Pakhtoonkhwa Milli Awami Party were earlier headed by ministers of the Jamiati-Ulema-i-Islam [JUI] and Pakistan National parties. Abdul Hamid Khan Achakzai of Pakhtoonkhwa was given the Department of Irrigation and Electricity which earlier belonged to Jamiati's Maulana Niaz Mohammad Dotani. Abdul Qahar Khan was given the Department of Services and General Administration which, prior to 19 August, was headed by JUI's Maulana Abdulbari and before that by the Muslim League's Saeed Hashemi. Dr. Kalimullah was placed in charge of Excise and Taxation, which earlier was headed by PNP's Mir Mohammad Ali Rind. Now Khan heads only the Revenue Department. The JUI has been affected the most by the reshuffling of departments; a JUI member, Malik Sikander Khan, is speaker of the provincial assembly and five other JUI members are cabinet ministers. According to the decisions taken on 19 August, JUI's Maulana Abdulbari was given the Services and General Administration Department in place of the Food Department and the Food department went to Abdul Karim Nushirwani. Now Maulana Abdulbari has been placed in charge of Planning and Development and the Services and General Administration Department

has been given to Abdul Qahar. JUI's Maulana Asmatullah formerly headed the Planning and Development Department, which on 19 August, was given to the Muslim League's Nawab Zulfiqar Ali Magasi and now is headed by Maulana Abdulbari. JUI's Maluana Amir Zaman was in charge of the Agriculture Department which is now headed by Maulana Asmatullah, and Maulana Amir Zaman has been placed in charge of the Ministry of Jails. JUI's Maulana Niaz Mohammad Dotani heads the Agriculture, Engineering, and Farm Water Management Department.

Thus, JUI has had to relinquish the Food, Irrigation, and Electricity departments and JUI ministers have been given the departments of Jails, Agriculture, Engineering, and Farm Water Management. JUI retains Public Health, Engineering, and Agriculture departments. The Agriculture Department was taken from one JUI minister and given to another JUI minister. PNP's Mir Hussain Ashraf lost the Livestock Department to Sardar Fateh Ali Umrani and now retains only the Fisheries Department. All three members of the Pakhtoonkhwa Milli Party, who are now ministers, are college graduates and at least two of them have been given important departments. Pakhtoonkhwa Amep [as published] and Jamiat-i-Ulema-i-Islam are rivals in the Pashtun areas of Balochistan. JUI members of the assembly, since they are also ministers, can do more for the people; now Pakhtoonkhwa enjoys a similar opportunity. This party participated in the 1988 elections as the Pakhtoonkhwa National Awami Party which is the name under which it was formed. Later, when it was joined by a Northwest frontier party, the new party was called Pakhtoonkhwa Milli Awami party. In 1988, Pakhtoonkhwa had two members in the provincial assembly; it decided at the time to join the coalition cabinet of Nawab Mohammad Akbar Bagti and one of its members, Sardar Bashir Tareen, was made the minister of Public Welfare, Zakat, Ashr and Endowments. Abdul Hamid Achakzai did not join the cabinet.

During the protest against the dissolution of the provincial assembly in 1988, Jamiat-i-Ulema-i-Islam, the Pakhtoonkhwa National Party, and the Balochistan National Alliance (led by Nawab Akbar Bagti) were all on the same side. When the assembly was formed again, all these parties formed a coalition government with Nawab Akbar Bagti as the chief minister. IJI was also included in the government. When Pakhtoonkhwa's name was changed, it was decided at the same time that it should withdraw from the government. Abdul Hamid Achakzai adhered to the decision and left the government party seat for a seat on the independent side. The other Pakhtoonkhwa member, Sardar Bashir Tareen, refused to abide by the party's decision and retained his seat in the cabinet. When Nawab Bagti formed the Jumhoori Watan Party, Sardar Bashir Tareen joined and currently represents this party in the senate. Towards the end, JUI also left Bagti's cabinet.

Pakhtoonkhwa has again joined the provincial cabinet. It is a nationalist party composed only of Pashtuns.

During the Afghan jihad, this party was strongly opposed to the mujaheddin and supported Najibollah and his predecessor Afghan governments. After the downfall of the Russians and the success of the mujaheddin, Pakhtoonkhwa was among the parties which suffered a political setback. Its sudden downtrend showed up in the municipal elections; in the minicipal committee elections in the border town of Chaman, Jamiat-i-Ulema-i-Islam candidates defeated Pakhtoonkhwa candidates by a large majority. Changed conditions may have forced the Pakhtoonkhwa Party to join the cabinet; the future will show whether or not it made the right political decision.

Turmoil Increasing

93AS0060B Karachi JASARAT in Urdu 20 Sep 92 p 3

[Editorial: "Crisis in Balochistan"]

[Text] Conditions for the survival of Taj Mohammad Jamali's government are taking a serious turn in Balochistan. His coalition government includes PDA [People's Democratic Alliance] or People's Party; Jamiat-i-Ulema-i-Islam [JUI] has already withdrawn itself. Jamali continued to enjoy a majority immediately after the JUI withdrawal, but now seven members of his own IJI [Islami Jamhoori Ittehad] or Muslim League have also turned against him. These include six members of the Jamali cabinet and the deputy speaker. The speaker is a JUI member and now the dissidents are demanding the election of a new leader. Balochistan has always suffered from political turmoil; one reason is that no single political party enjoys a majority; and second, there is constant interference from the Center. At the present time, the Center has sent three able ministers to solve the Balochistan government's problem which, however, appears to be insoluble.

Last Friday, Taj Mohammad Jamali visited Nawab Magasi at his home but failed to bring about a reconciliation. Meanwhile, the entire PDA is protesting against the participation of three members of the People's Party in the Jamali cabinet on the grounds that, although the PDA is in the opposition in all other parts of the country, in Balochistan it is part of the government. Benazir Bhutto's dilemma is that she does not want Nawab Akbar Bagti to hold office again under any circumstances. Jamiat-i-Ulema-i-Islam is also in the opposition in the Center, but because of the special political situation in Balochistan and especially because of the Pakhtoonkhwa Party, Jamiat has not only sided with IJI but, as the leader of the assembly, nominated Jamali. JUI considers Pakhtoonkhwa a vestige of Russian imperialism and says that support for it would be sufficient grounds for the annulment of marriage. It is irrelevant that both parties reached an agreement during municipal elections in Zub and Loralai.

The give-no-offense-take-no-offense personality of Balochistan's chief minister is responsible for the chaotic situation. He accepts everyone's advice, which has a deleterious effect on discipline. It is hoped that the arrival of three federal ministers in Quetta will dispel the

crisis for the moment but not for long. What the people of Balochistan really need, instead of interference from the Center, is to be allowed to make their own decisions. All political groups including the opposition should remember that any government which comes into office in Balochistan will not be based on a clear majority and hence will always be under pressure. Ministries will always be distributed like candy and everyone's advice will be listened to. We do not think that anyone else can come and change the situation completely. It is therefore necessary to refrain from constant tests of strength; all should get together and try to work for the progress and

stability of the people of Balochistan. The chief minister is decent enough to listen to what everyone has to say. The question is, who are these people who want to have their wishes carried out? The swindles in land distribution and enforcement of laws and regulations should be ended and the swelling ranks of ministers and advisers reduced; otherwise Balochistan will always remain in turmoil, which neither Nawab Bagti nor Nawab Magasi will be able to control. The linguistic issue has raised its head in Balochistan; instead of fighting amongst themselves, the authorities should try to put this genie back in its bottle.

Government Support of Religious ID Cards Condemned

Urged to Withdraw Decision

93AS0119A Islamabad *THE MUSLIM in English*
24 Oct 92 p 4

[Article by Obaidur Rehman Abbasi: "Religion Column in ID Cards; Government Urged to Withdraw Decision"; quotation marks as published]

[Text] Abbottabad, Oct 23—The IJI [Islami Jamhoori Ittehad] government has once again bowed down before mullaism prevailing in the country, and has hastily inducted the most controversial religion column in the national identity card [NIC] which is creating panic among the public in general and minorities in particular. First time in the history of Pakistan minorities whose rights had been guaranteed by the Constitution of the country felt insecure in the country which was created in the name of the most liberal and powerful religion of the world.

The news on the issue was received in Hazara Division with a shock and most of the educated class including minority members, lawyers, intellectuals, and social workers of the division expressed their concern over the issue and termed it un-Islamic and unconstitutional. "This would further open various controversial chapters in the country soon," they feared.

Mohammad Akbar Khan Swati, President Peshawar High Court Bar Association (Abbottabad Bench), Sardar Mohammad Aslam Khan ex-Senator and former President District Bar Association Abbottabad, Fazle Haq Abbasi, General Secretary PHBA in their separate Press statements strongly criticised the government stand on the induction of religion column in the national identity card. They while terming it unconstitutional and un-Islamic feared that government must have thought the consequences before the induction of the column.

They said minorities rights have already been guaranteed by the Holy Prophet (PBUH [Peace Be Upon Him]) and authorities while inducting the column in the national identity card has committed a sin. They demanded withdrawal of the orders immediately.

Dozens of lawyers belonging to social welfare and legal aid forum under the presidentship of Ahsan Shah Advocate, president of the Forum held a detailed meeting and discussed the issue in length. Later in a press statement issued here on Friday they strongly opposed the decision and termed it against Islamic teachings. The lawyers have castigated the government on bowing to the blackmail of the so-called religious and sectarian parties. The commission has demanded the government to take back his decision and have vowed to fight this issue in the court of law soon. The decision would give rise to the feelings of being second and third rate citizens in minorities which would be disastrous for the integrity of the country.

The decision of the government would encourage various sectarian forces to go to the extent of demanding a column of sect such as Sunni, Deobandi, Shia, and Wahabi in the NIC. They further said the meeting which was attended by Zakir Paul Hussain Advocate Syed Arshad; Tahir Ali Advocate besides others immediately constituted a committee which would file a writ in the High Court against the decision of the government.

Meanwhile Maseehi Baradri in Hazara has also opposed the decision of the government on the issue and demanded its withdrawal.

Meanwhile, a big protest rally was being organised at Mansehra to oppose the provincial government decision of suspending the Forest Co-operative Societies of Hazara Division. According to details the meeting would be addressed by Syed Qasim Shah, MPA [member Provincial Assembly], Shehzada Gustasip Khan, MPA, Faiz Mohammad Khan, MPA and representatives of all the 32 Forest Co-operative Societies owners. Sources in Mansehra told this scribe that thousands of the affectees who had been employed in 32 societies and lost the job after the suspension of the societies would be participating in the meeting.

Will Affect Foreign Investment

93AS0119B Islamabad *THE MUSLIM in English*
25 Oct 92 p 9

[Text] Recently the Pakistan government has decided to add a new religious column in the national identity cards. But the human rights groups and the non-Muslim citizens of Pakistan have protested against this decision of the government.

The daily WASHINGTON POST has carried an article to this effect, arguing that Islamic fundamentalism has been increasingly consolidating their hold on the country's institutions.

According to the authors of the article Pakistan served as a base for the most conservative and Islamic fundamentalist movements in the world during the past fifty years. They claim that the influence of fundamentalists have increased considerably in the past fifteen years.

In the villages, the conservative ulema and khateebis in their religious sermons to the illiterate people in juma congregation try to bring them (the villagers) under their influence. These authors said that the radical Islamic groups in Saudi Arabia and Iran finance their like-minded parties and help them in setting up of Islamic centres.

In the past decade the Islamic fundamentalism had added to the socio-economic problems of the country.

The daily WASHINGTON POST writes that last year the new Pakistan government under the pressure of the influential religious leaders, has fulfilled their demands, by formulating new harsh laws in the name of Shariat. The Federal Shariat Court has been given more powers.

The article narrates a tale of a Christian teacher who was stabbed to death by a fundamentalist youth in Lahore. The fundamentalist killed the Christian, following unconfirmed reports that he (the Christian) has committed Islamic desecrations. According to a report of the Human Rights Organisation, the attacker was welcomed in the area by the police, religious persons and villagers as a "hero."

The article says that such incidents will further deepen socio-economic and religious crisis in the country. The daily WASHINGTON POST writes that according to the western intellectuals, if the trend of human rights violations remained unchecked, then it will amount to one step reverse for Pakistan.

In the meantime, the representatives of businessmen and traders community, say this will discourage foreign investment in Pakistan.

Christians Fear ID Cards

93AS0119C Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English
23 Oct 92 p 1

[Article by Badrul Islam Butt: "Christians Seek UN Intervention"]

[Text] Lahore, Oct 22—Christians are stated to be preparing a memorandum for Secretary General of the United Nations, calling his attention to the inclusion of citizens religion in national identity card, which, as they believe, runs against international charter of human rights, ratified by the Pakistan Government as well.

A preliminary communication on this issue had already been addressed to UN Secretary General by a Christian leader urging the former to use his good offices to dissuade Pakistan government from taking a controversial decision. As claimed by another Christian leader forcing the citizens to disclose and get registered their religion in ID card, which necessarily was a document bearing nationality and domicile of the citizens, gives rise to genuine apprehensions in minorities of being discriminated in social life. He said representations on behalf of Christian community in Pakistan will be sent to all the world bodies on human rights.

Sharif Controlled by Mullahs

93AS0119D Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English
26 Oct 92 p 6

[Article by Ibne Latif: "God Save Pakistan"; quotation marks as published]

[Text] Hats off to Prime Minister [PM] Nawaz Sharif and his government for achieving another milestone in 'Islamising' Pakistan. By acceding to the mullah's demand of including the column of religion in the National ID cards, the government has paved the way for ridding Pakistan of its outcastes, the minorities and the like. As a matter of fact, the PM and his government

should have sprung a surprise on the mullahs and wrested the initiative by renaming the identity cards as the 'Religion ID Card.'

They could have gone a step further and pre-empted the mullahs' next demand by announcing the inclusion of a 'Sect' column in that card and named it the 'Sectarian ID Card.' Or, maybe go still further to a 'Caste' or a 'Tribe' card. Who needs a national ID card anyway? We prefer to be known the world-over by what we actually are today. An ID card without this level of information is likely to misproject us as a 'unified and civilised' nation.

The government's decision is in keeping with the PM's oft-repeated statement, most recently in Gilgit, promising to rid Pakistan of religio-political parties promoting sectarianism in the country. Yes, Mr. Prime Minister, why should you and your government be left behind in adding a feather to your high-placed caps in serving the cause of Islam. You can now rightly lay a claim in the history of this beleaguered nation and be amongst the 'chosen predecessors' who did the same for Pakistan. By succumbing to the pressure of the mullahs and the like, you have definitely gone a step further in 'uniting' this country into a homogeneous society.

Indeed, Pakistan needed another dose of such 'unification' at this stage to get rid of the economic and the many ills it is plagued with ever since independence. You and your government will have achieved what the opponents of the great Quaid-i-Azam could not achieve during the Quaid's and their own lifetimes.

If the decision has been made out of ignorance, it reflects the government's naivety to the repercussions which are likely to follow. If, however, the decision is for political expediency, then the PM and his government are in for a surprise. Courting the mullahs has always proved fatal. This class is out of grab total power and at all costs, fair or foul. Since they have always been rejected at the polls, they prefer to share power through the backdoor or blackmail. World history is replete with instances where the clerics, be it Christians or Muslims, have reduced nations to nought by dividing them over trivialities to keep their power alive.

Events of recent history in Pakistan are still fresh in our minds. The mullahs had offered to make the senior Bhutto Life-president/prime minister should he accede to their demand of declaring Ahmadis non-Muslims. Bhutto, who was otherwise known for his 'love' for Islamic values and for whom the mullahs and their like were no more than a private joke, took them for their word and passed the infamous Bill of 1974. The honeymoon, however, did not last very long, for three years later the same mullahs were on the streets demanding his head. They ultimately saw him to the gallows.

Gen Zia, the dictator, took over Islamisation from where Bhutto had left. He did everything possible to please the mullahs in return for their support to keep him in power. He made the mullahs his constituency. The nation got its

blackest laws and ordinances during his era. He introduced his brand of *shariat* with the *hudood* laws. The entire fabric of society was 'Islamised Zia-style' from top to bottom. He used the same old 'divide and rule' formula to prolong his rule. Some of his achievements before he left for his eternal abode included the deliverance of MQM [Mohajir Qaumi Movement] to the nation; three million additional refugees to feed, cloth and house; 'heroin' to the nation's sick for their health care; and the 'kalashnikovs' to the nation's honourable to defend their honour.

He rewarded the Jamaat-i-Islami to reap a fortune out of the Afghan crisis in return for their support at home. But alas, he was deserted by the same mullahs who termed him a usurper in the name of Islam. They termed his Islam the GHQ [General Headquarters]-brand of Islam. If history is any judge, then these two 'celebrated' leaders met a rather unusual end, not witnessed for the true servants of Islam.

Mr. Prime Minister, time and again we hear your rhetoric to take this country out of the woods and into the 21st Century. If this is to be achieved by following the dictates of the mullahs, then we should drop the 2 of the 21st century. The mullah of today will definitely drag us back to the 1st century. The more ignorant and illiterate the nation, the more it suits the mullahs who can then concentrate on their favourite pastime of *bandar bant* and, of course, 'eliminating demons' from infected souls. The F-10 scandal is still fresh in our minds.

Why should the mullah worry if the economy goes to a shambles. It is not for them to present an alternative to the 'interest-based' economy. Already, our partners in trade and donors are eyeing us with suspicion. The much-trumpeted foreign investment is not coming despite the government's best efforts. What kind of signals is your government sending by such moves?

It is time the powers-that-be woke up before this nation is plunged into an unabysmal and unfathomable pit of absurdantism. It is not for the state to interfere in religion. In the matter of faith, let it be left to the individual to decide what he/she wants. Each individual is answerable for his/her actions. This country has already bled to death at the hands of these half-baked mullahs. Give this nation a break, please, from the Islam hammered down their heads the Pakistan-Penal-Code way!

It is time the mullahs were told in unequivocal terms that enough is enough. This country needs a 'saviour' who can take these mullahs by the horn and tell them to stop playing havoc with the destiny of this country. These mullahs opposed its creation tooth and nail. Don't help them achieve their objective. We owe our children a free Pakistan, a just Pakistan, a prosperous Pakistan, in short, a model Pakistan which is free from all kinds of exploitation based on caste, colour or creed which they can be rightly proud of. God save Pakistan!

National Islamization's Effect Viewed, Forecast Given

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[Article by Talat Aslam: "Resurgent Islam, Can It Conquer Pakistan?"; italicized words, quotation marks as published]

[Text] Once again, an increasingly isolated government is going through the motions of playing the Islamic card in what seems suspiciously like an attempt to tighten its loosening grip on power. Through sheer expediency and by default, the country is seeing power being handed over to an unpopular minority, making the prospects of Pakistan becoming a theocratic state seem less far-fetched than they once seemed.

Meanwhile, in the rest of the Muslim world, Islam is emerging as a militant force challenging a number of formerly entrenched secular regimes. Given this changing domestic and international scenario, what are the chances of Pakistan being conquered by militant Islam? What has been the impact of 15 years of Islamisation on the ideological outlook of the populace? Have the social and economic changes taking place in the country created an atmosphere more conducive to the rise of religious groups? And will the increasingly vehement anti-United States sentiment being espoused by the religious parties bring them the popular support they have always been denied?

A HERALD special report on the prospects of an Islamic resurgence in Pakistan...

"All this talk of Islamisation is a fraud," says the taxi driver bluntly, as the rectangular slabs of marble that house the country's parliament building appear at the top of Islamabad's Constitution Avenue. Pointing towards the structure, he adds contemptuously, "It is all simply an attempt to hold on to their *kursis* and nothing else. What Pakistan needs is the real Islam—what we need here is a Khomeini."

The taxi driver, a man in his late 30s, may not be a perfect representative of the mood of the country but his views echo a refrain heard in countless buses, wagons and railway compartments across Pakistan. His position also encapsulates the dilemma of a country whose population has never voted for the religious parties at election time but where Islam remains a potent symbol nevertheless.

Forty five years after the creation of Pakistan, the country continues to suffer from an acute identity crisis, born out of this same dilemma—what kind of role should Islam play, if any, in a country like Pakistan? And what kind of Islam is in keeping with the particular needs and aspirations of the people of this country?

Unlike the experience of a growing number of other Muslim countries, where Islam has emerged as a powerful force rejecting the status quo, the Pakistani experience of Islamisation has been less liberating. In fact, the people of Pakistan know only too well how Islam has been exploited since the '50s by a succession of rulers who felt threatened or sought some kind of legitimacy, a process that continues to this day.

Once again, an increasingly isolated IJI [Islami Jamhoori Ittehad] government is going through the motions of playing the Pakistani card in what seems suspiciously like an attempt to tighten its loosening grip on power. Not surprisingly, the decision to amend the constitution to purge it of all 'unIslamic' elements and to breathe legislative life into the controversial Shariat Bill, is taking place in the backdrop of byzantine intrigues to oust Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif from office. History, it seems, is bent upon repeating itself as farce.

By going in for a new bout of Islamisation, the Nawaz Sharif government seems to be in the process of cutting off its nose to spite its face. By surrendering large areas of political ground to the religious lobby without so much as a debate, the government may well be setting in motion a process over which it could soon lose control. Through sheer expediency and by default, the country is seeing power being handed over to an unpopular minority, making the prospects of Pakistan becoming a theocracy seem not as far-fetched as it once seemed.

The IJI government, however, is simply following in the footsteps of many of its predecessors. The Muslim League governments in the early '50s exploited Islamic sentiments to hold on to power. Ayub Khan, the 'moderniser' and the 'mullah basher' of popular liberal mythology, increasingly adopted Islamic rhetoric at the fag end of his 'decade of development.' Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, besieged by a movement led by the religious parties, declared the Ahmedis non-Muslims, banned alcohol, declared Friday a public holiday, all simply to retain power. And the unpopular regime of General Ziaul Haq went furthest of all by exploiting Islam to postpone elections, hang an elected prime minister and make expedient alliances with key religious groups in order to legitimise its rule.

As the prominent Middle East and Islamic scholar, Dr. Eqbal Ahmed, points out, this is not something unique to this country or this era. "Throughout Islamic history, Islam has served as a convenient refuge for scoundrel regimes."

The current moves at Islamisation could well be shrugged off as another elaborate exercise in skin-saving tokenism were it not for two factors that vest it with greater significance. First, there has been a considerable cumulative effect of the various Islamisation measures introduced over the years. Whatever their original intention, these measures have had a significant bearing, not only at the legal and constitutional level, but also in less

tangible ways, like on social attitudes and the creation of groups and lobbies more receptive to Islamic ideas.

Second, Pakistan's attempts at Islamisation are obviously not taking place in an international vacuum. Since the current round of Islamisation began in the late '70s, the world has changed beyond recognition, with the United States emerging as the sole superpower following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Furthermore, following the momentous events that saw the Shah of Iran ousted by a popular revolution led by religious leaders, Islam has rapidly emerged in large parts of the Muslim world as a militant and dynamic force challenging formerly entrenched secular regimes in country after country—in Egypt, Algeria, Tunisia, Jordan, Syria and elsewhere.

The emergence of these militant Islamic groups has sent shudders down western spines. Today, the spectre of what is lumped together as 'Islamic fundamentalism' is the newest bogey in the eyes of the United States. The proponents of militant Islam have increasingly attacked the United States for its antipathy to Islam, a line that has obviously had repercussions in Pakistan, a country where anti-United States feeling has always remained an emotive force below the surface.

Given the changing domestic and international context, can a country like Pakistan ever be conquered by militant Islam? What direction are all these factors pushing this country towards? What has been the effect of 15 years of Islamisation on the ideological bearings of the populace? Has it created an atmosphere more conducive to the rise of religious groups? And will the current attempts to Islamise the country from above overtake the rise of militant Islam from below?

Clearly, the two processes are quite distinct but linked. While activist Islam views the United States as a satanic force of evil, the official Pakistani version remains pro-United States. While activist Islam challenges the entire westernised elite and status quo, the Pakistani variant is widely regarded as an attempt to forestall change. While the Nawaz Sharif government believes it can put a lid on any pressure from the Islamic lobby by acting to bring in its own Shariat Bill, it may well do the reverse. The knots in which the government finds itself over the issue of *riba* is just one example of the dangers ahead. "You can't appease the religious lobby by throwing it a few scraps," says a Lahore intellectual. "It only increases its appetite for more."

At the surface level of party politics, at least, there does not seem to have been any dramatic drift towards the religious right in the last 20 years. In 1970, the Pakistan People's Party [PPP], on a left of centre manifesto, managed to secure 38.9 percent of the popular vote. In 1988, despite all the upheavals of the intervening years, the percentage remained an astonishingly constant 38.7 percent. Even in the disputed 1990 polls, where the PPP was routed, the percentage of its vote dropped by just over one percent. The religious parties, such as the JUI

[Jamiat-i-Ulema-i-Islam] and JUP [Jamiat-i-Ulema-i-Pakistan], have seen their combined vote drop from 16 percent to less than 5 percent in 1990. As for the Jamaat, its support has remained constant at around the 10 percent mark.

In 1988, despite all the ideological barrage of Islamic rhetoric during the Zia years, the PPP emerged as the single largest party. Significantly, the party was led by a woman, much to the chagrin of sections of the religious right. In 1990, it seems that the country's populace had lurched dramatically to the right. This was not the case. Even disregarding the controversy surrounding the fairness of these polls and the fact that the number of votes cast for the PPP did not fall as dramatically as the fall in number of seats, the issues sentiment and Islamic ideology, Islam as a sentiment is very strongly present among Pakistanis. The fact that people vote differently using a number of other criteria is another matter. People certainly did not 'reject' Islam in 1970 or 1988.

However, whatever the actual motives behind the casting of votes, the fact remains that Pakistanis do not support the religious parties at election time.

In fact, according to one Islamabad scholar, Pakistan seems to have witnessed quite the reverse of what was happening elsewhere in the Islamic world. "In Pakistan, the Islamic movement has been frozen, or even cut back," he argues. "The Jamaat-i-Islami, the leading politico-religious party, has made no gains at the public level. What gains it has made have been at the official level."

The Jamaat obviously damaged itself considerably by allying itself with an unpopular military regime. It ended up being used by Zia when he desperately wanted legitimacy and discarded when he felt he could survive on his own. The same has happened, once again, with the Nawaz Sharif government parting company with its former ally.

The lack of popular appeal for the religious party stems from a number of factors. Among them is the fact that the parties lack any organic links with the poor and are too solidly middle class in their backing, origins and instincts. This is in marked contrast to the more radical Middle East movements. This urban, middle class outlook has prevented them from expanding their base beyond a narrow area and class, largely concentrated in the cities. However, things are slowly beginning to change for a number of reasons. The most important of these is the growing influence of the parties at the state level and the repercussions this change has had, even in the rural areas.

Most analyses of Islamisation in Pakistan have focused on the state's various attempts to Islamise the country's legal structure by decree. Over the years, there has been a great deal of material, particularly in the English language press, commenting on the effects this thinking has had on various groups. Human rights activists, women's groups and representatives of the religious

minorities have all criticised various aspects of the laws and ordinances passed since the early '80s, and a vocal liberal lobby has emerged to oppose all moves that impinge on their basic rights in the name of Islamisation (see box [not reproduced]).

However, what has received less attention is the overall effect of the measures taken during the Zia years in creating groups, lobbies and interests that have a stake in the entire, state-sponsored Islamisation process.

If at the popular level the religious parties continue to be rebuffed, they did gain considerably in influence during the Zia years. For one, the media and educational policies, which were formulated to please this lobby obviously had an effect on the overall atmosphere. More important, perhaps, was the setting up of zakat and ushr committees, the sharp rise in government grants to religious trusts, madrassahs and mosques, which helped create a kind of religious bureaucracy that could wield at least some power at the local level.

This helped give a certain status and confidence to the religious lobby, something that it traditionally lacked, especially in the country's rural areas. In fact, the village maulvi in large parts of Pakistan continues to be little more than a *kammi*-retained on the munificence of landlords to perform certain key Islamic rituals and little else. The financial stipends given to imam masjids and mashaikhs (ironically a legacy of Mr. Bhutto's era) was raised considerably by General Zia, helping boost the *maulvi*'s image somewhat. In some areas, the maulvi was now an independent entity who could even look the landlord in the eye—something unthinkable in the past.

Abida Hussain, former MNA [Member of National Assembly] from Jhang, a city that has become the nerve centre of sectarian politics, argues that, "because of the inflow of funds from various quarters, the maulvi lobby became a new upwardly mobile bourgeoisie which began challenging the gentry. They have now become a new class."

But it was the rise of the madrassah that is perhaps the most significant legacy of the Zia years, whose effects have still not been fully felt. Through the madrassahs, the religious lobby has created a potential constituency that is unprecedented in size, and from its portals have emerged a new pool of zealous new recruits to the cause.

In recent years, thanks to the construction of madrassahs, the religious lobby has succeeded in establishing a foothold in the rural areas. The Jamiat-i-Ulema-i-Islam has perhaps been the greatest beneficiary of this trend because of its vast mosque and madrassah network. In fact, while the base of the other major religious parties continues to be concentrated, with some minor exceptions, in the urban areas among the middle class and bazaar, the JUI has been making inroads into the unlikely of places—the Seraiki belt of the Punjab, Balochistan's Baloch areas, and on a much smaller scale, even in rural Sindh.

An appeal to sectarianism seems to have helped boost the party's rural base. The JUI's militant and vitriolically anti-Shia offshoot, the Anjuman-i-Sipah-e-Sahaba [ASS] is perhaps the fastest growing of the more religious groups. The ASSP [expansion not given] has built an organised and militant cadre from its base in Jhang, a town which today has become a hotbed of sectarian strife. In Balochistan, the JUI has found itself at odds with the Zikris, a small sect concentrated in Mekran. And in Gilgit, the JUI and ASSP have exploited the sensitive sectarian mix of the area to their advantage. This encroachment of religious extremism into the rural areas is a significant recent development and is a result of a number of factors.

One traditional argument against Pakistan being swept aside by a popular religious movement has always been the particular nature of Islam in this country—particularly in its rural manifestation. The Pakistani version of Islam has its roots in the specific cultural and political experience of the Muslims of the subcontinent. "For the Muslim elite and intellectuals, Sir Syed and Allama Iqbal, and not Maudoodi, were the poles around which Islam revolved," says one Islamabad-based journalist. Both figures, in their very different ways, of course, did not seek to renounce the West or democracy and had a deep antipathy to the mullah's brand of orthodox Islam.

Similarly, in the rural areas, the maulvi has traditionally been the object of derision, and the anti mullah joke remains a common feature of rural culture. The celebrated sufi poets of the Punjab and Sindh, who still enjoy enormous popular veneration, wrote many of their most celebrated verses against the hypocrisy and double-faced nature of the orthodoxy.

In fact, in large parts of the rural areas, Islam is tinged with an overwhelming sufi flavour and has absorbed all kinds of elements from older cultural traditions. It is this tradition that has traditionally created so much antipathy in the rural areas for the rigid, more austere brand of Islam propagated by the urban-based ulema.

Rather than the mullah, who has traditionally been no more than a menial, the rural populace finds solace and religious fulfillment at the shrines dotted across the country. The pir factor, with its own heterodox and relaxed religious codes still remains a magnet in large parts of rural Pakistan. It is to the shrine that the population, both men and women, has traditionally turned in times of need—to pray for the birth of a son, to heal a sick animal, to get rid of disease and pestilence, and increasingly, to get someone a job in Qatar.

As a result of this, the rural areas had for long remained a buffer against the penetration of orthodox Islamic ideas. But some of this is changing. For one, over the last decade and a half, the rural-urban composition has been steadily changing in favor of the urban areas. In 1961, the urban population of the country was 9.6 million (22.5 percent of the total population). In 1972 it had

grown to 16.6 million (25.4 percent) by 1981 it was 23.8 million (28.3 percent) and in 1992 the figure is projected at 39.12 million, which means that a massive 32.6 percent of the population now lives in urban areas. Meanwhile, the contribution of agriculture to GNP [Gross National Product] has also steadily declined, standing today at less than a quarter of the total GNP. With the rural areas gradually becoming urbanised at the edges, especially in the Punjab, the pattern of politics will obviously also undergo a gradual change.

Meanwhile, subtle changes have already taken place over the years in the role of the village maulvi and the nature of religious practices in the countryside. The Zia years saw a general atmosphere hostile to certain practices—such as music and dancing—which were once far more exuberantly pursued in the villages. Increasingly, these practices have become culturally less acceptable, especially in the Frontier and parts of upper Punjab.

The maulvis, meanwhile, began receiving stipends from the state and were able to gain a foothold in some areas. Furthermore, the appearance of madrassahs close to the rural areas also gave a whole new power base to a certain kind of maulvi. One consequence has been that the rural areas, too, are today feeling the effects of orthodox religion.

The role of the shrine is also undergoing important changes. In the Zia years, the mazaar began to be seen as a dangerous alternative to orthodoxy and was soon co-opted by the state. The auqaf department took over the upkeep of many shrines and began to fund them, making the shrines and their *gaddi nashins* dependent on state patronage. As a result, the practices at shrines began to reflect the state's ideological leanings, losing some of their more effervescent tendencies and becoming tinged with the piety associated with the mosque.

All these changes have been gradual and have not effected the overall flavour of rural religion. But the fact remains that the orthodox maulvi has slowly gained a foothold and some influence. He may not yet be in a position to wield power, but he has certainly become capable of making his presence felt if he so chooses.

The rapid mechanisation of agriculture has also seen a large influx from the rural to urban areas. This fact is bound to have repercussions on attitudes and inclinations in the years to come. Classically, as in the case of Egypt, the uprooted rural migrant was a prime target for recruitment to the ranks of groups such as the Ikhwanul Muslimeen. In cities like Karachi, too, some migrants from the north are likely to get involved with militant or sectarian religious groups through mohallah contacts with maulvis who share the same ethnic or regional background. In fact, most of the imam masjids in the city are from the NWFP [North-West Frontier Province] or northern Punjab. In recent years, the maulvi from the Seraiki areas of Punjab has also become a feature in Karachi.

"In the city, rural Muslims find themselves uprooted from their rural moorings, made up of sufi tradition, local superstitions and communal rituals. They leave all this behind, bringing with them a deep loyalty to Islam and a memory of being good Muslims," says Dr. Eqbal Ahmed.

However, in countries such as Pakistan urbanisation has not been as concentrated as in other countries. It has, in fact, been fairly evenly distributed. If Karachi has received a large influx, the Punjab's central heartland too has seen rapid urbanisation. The effects of this are bound to be quite distinct from countries such as Egypt where the rural migration has concentrated in one mega city, Cairo.

Furthermore, it is not automatically the case that the rural migrant will be recruited to religious extremism. The migrant to Karachi is typically not the isolated, atomised and alienated individual of the classical texts but finds himself part of a wider network of biradari or tribe from which he finds initial sustenance. This serves against the isolation and alienation that makes individuals seek out groups with enduring and familiar symbols.

In fact, it is the students who come to urban colleges from rural areas who are likely to better fit this category. In many cases, rural students find themselves alienated and isolated from their urban surroundings and cannot relate to their more 'modern' colleagues from the city. They find themselves drawn towards the religious parties, who make special efforts to recruit them at an early stage (interestingly, in rural Sindh this pattern is followed by the nationalist rather than religious groups). "The moderately educated rural student in a big city is perhaps the most prone to be recruited by the religious parties," says a lecturer in Multan. "They allow him to feel a sense of continuity and belonging in a hostile environment. Meanwhile, his education makes him increasingly look down at the practices of his family in the village as ignorant superstitions, divorced from the 'real' Islam."

Meanwhile, in the Punjab, there has been a phenomenal increase in the number of persons who have achieved some kind of new prosperity either as a result of the Gulf boom or through the changes in the agricultural economy. A large number of semi-urban centres and mandi towns have cropped up on the fringes of the rural areas, giving birth to an increasingly powerful group of traders, shopkeepers, transporters, middle men serving the agricultural sector and so forth.

It is this class which has restlessly been seeking a political voice and role over the years. It is a class that is fiercely nationalist in outlook, deeply suspicious of the centralising instincts of the old PPP, and is generally seen as a bastion of conservatism. For this class, religion is an inseparable part of its identity, but there is a great deal of no-nonsense pragmatism present as well.

In many areas, this class has begun to make its presence felt at the local bodies polls, where they have taken on

powerful landed interests. Because of the lack of alternatives, most of them find themselves in broad sympathy with the Muslim league, but some are also attracted to the appeal of sectarian politics. In Jhang, for example, a sizeable proportion of the traders and shopkeepers have funded and supported the ASSP. Here, sectarianism has been seen as the vehicle through which to take on the powerful local landlords—who happen to be Shias.

This new middle class at the rural fringes has been restlessly seeking a vehicle to express itself. At the local level, it has emerged as a force but ideologically it has not yet charted out a single course. The battle for the hearts and minds of this class of 'little men' is likely to continue and its outcome will have a profound effect on the shape of Pakistani politics in the future.

Similarly, the wave of Gulf migration that coincided with the Zia period brought about far-reaching changes in Pakistani society. It brought wealth to new classes and it changed the face of relatively backward areas, especially in the NWFP and the Punjab's barani belt. Again, the attitudes of the newly affluent Gulf migrants have not received the attention they deserve. What evidence there is suggests a degree of conservatism but no great ideological lurch to the right. Many of them feel disgruntled about the state of the country's infrastructure, corruption and general inefficiency around them after their return from wealthier countries.

But are there any signs of the Gulf returnees being attracted to religious groups following their return? Interestingly, one recent study on the Gulf boom by Jonathan Addleton finds very little evidence of any great shift to the religious right among them, at least as far as voting patterns are concerned.

It is, however, clear that the Gulf experience and the prosperity it brought has made many of the returnees more socially conservative. "Another aspect not normally commented upon is the confidence the Gulf experience gave to a whole generation of workers: it created a new sense of pride in being Pakistani, a sense of national confidence," says Mushahid Hussain. "In the Gulf, Pakistanis found to their surprise that they could compete with every nationality successfully."

In the experience of other Muslim countries where Islamic movements have challenged the status quo, there has always been a strong revulsion on the part of the people against the cultural lifestyles of the elite. This is one factor that separates Pakistan from other Muslim countries. Although there are vast differences of wealth in this country, and conspicuous consumption is now blatant and glaring, the elite has not divorced itself completely from the people at large as in say, Egypt, prerevolutionary Iran, Algeria and a whole host of other Muslim countries.

"Even the most westernised Pakistani women (with the exception of a minuscule minority) have adapted their fashions and dress to indigenous cultural norms and

remained fashionable without being westernised," says one Karachi-based women's activist. "The mini-skirt has thankfully never been adopted here, unlike in some Middle Eastern and Far Eastern countries."

In Pakistan, while there is a big gulf between the westernised, English-speaking elite and the rest, there has been a semblance of contact and continuity between the two. In fact, even as the English-speaking westernised elite becomes more estranged from the mass of people, a buffer has also been created to blur the divide.

Formerly 'pukka' institutions like the army and the civil service have become gradually more 'native,' manned by people from a very different social strata than their 'English medium' forerunners. There has, in fact, been a fair amount of social mobility, especially in the Punjab heartland, which has served to obscure the gulf. This is reflected in the kind of social conservatism of a new kind emanating from institutions such as the army. "The indigenisation of these institutions is constantly misread by the liberal intelligentsia to mean that they have become more 'fundamentalist,'" argues one former army officer. "While the army may have become more nationalist and socially conservative in outlook than in my time, it is debatable that they have lurched towards the religious right."

But even if the gulf between the average Pakistani and the elite is not as large as in other countries, it is still there—a factor that is picked up by maulvis who scathingly attack on the 'maghribzada' elite for its depravity. This is exacerbated by the fact that a section of the elite has gradually abandoned all notions of social justice, equity and is no longer burdened by worrying about nationalism, socialism and the rest. After Bhutto, there has been a frenzied bout of conspicuous consumption, with even the new PPP proud of flaunting its Pajeros at every opportunity.

The experience of the people with politicians, too, has not been edifying. There is a growing disgust at what is seen as their propensity for corruption and self-serving.

"It is quite clear that our ruling groups have become totally bankrupt," says one former PPP leader. "Whether it is on social justice, economic development, law and order, security, sovereignty or democracy—the ruling class has just not delivered on any of these counts." He adds that it is surprising why the religious right has not been more successful than it has.

The secular elite seems to have come off rather lightly so far, but there are danger signals for them in the future. Perhaps the area fraught with greatest possibilities for an Islamic resurgence in this country is the area of Pakistan's relations with the U.S. This is one area where a majority of Pakistanis appear more ideologically united than on any other issue. "The Muslim world is literally under siege today," argues one activist. "And in most of the Islamic world, the primary identity still comes from its Muslimness. National identities have not taken root independent of Islam and Islamic solidarity. The

Muslim psyche remains transnational in the subcontinent." This he argues makes this region potentially very volatile, given the U.S. attitude on issues such as Israel, Iraq, Bosnia, Kashmir and what is seen as 'the Islamic bomb.'

According to Mushahid Hussain, in the subcontinent, an enduring manifestation of this is found in the historical ethos of Pan-Islamism. This ethos was evident in the massive upsurge of feelings that rose up during the Khilafat movement for the Muslims in faraway Turkey, and remains a powerful force. Mushahid argues that many of the eruptions in Islam's history have been marked by this Pan-Islamic feeling and contained a strong streak of anti-Westernism. He lists the 1979 Mecca mosque burning incident, the 1988 eruption of violence over the Salman Rushdie episode, and finally the Gulf war as key events reflecting this tendency.

In all these cases, and most dramatically in the last, there was a spontaneous upsurge of anti-Western sentiment provoked by events far away from the borders of Pakistan.

Given the present global situation, this feeling can be exploited without too much effort by any party that chooses to do so. With the mainstream political parties, by and large, taking a pro-U.S. line, there is a great vacuum which is currently only filled by the religious right. The anti-U.S., nationalist left, which once had a presence within the PPP and elsewhere, is now all but dead.

In fact, the liberal westernised elite is going to be increasingly faced with a major dilemma. So far, it has cleverly covered its own estrangement from the mood of the population by playing upon the people's own natural gut-level dislike of theocratic ideas. However, on the issue of the United States, the liberal intelligentsia is beginning to find itself in a fix. Their intense horror of the religious lobby has led them into adopting the language of western ideologues, choosing to attack 'fundamentalism' as an unmitigated evil without seeking to understand that 'fundamentalism' is at heart a defensive and paranoid response to western belligerence and the alienating lifestyle of a westernised elite. In fact, some recent Pakistani reports on fundamentalism have been indistinguishable from the kind of lurid alarmist material currently being churned out from the West.

Ironically, the more belligerent the United States gets in its approach to the resurgence of Islam, the more strident our liberal intelligentsia seems to get in its mullah-bashing. A coherent indigenous and nationalist posture on the United States seems to have vanished without trace from those opposing the religious right. But there are some signs of a rethinking of the sterile secularist versus fundamentalist debate in certain quarters.

"We spent the '80s attacking obscurantism because we saw it as linked to the overall political struggle for democracy," says one woman's rights activist from Lahore. "Today, things are very different. I think it's

time to do some soul-searching, and try to understand the direction of changes taking place in Pakistan and the particular strands of Islam that are important to the people of this country. Otherwise we risk becoming a mirror image of the 'fundos' we deride. Mullah-bashing is now not enough."

The rulers of this country are increasingly going to find themselves in a bind as a result of this growing polarisation between militant Islam. The ruling establishment seems to carry on with bouts of Islamisation from above as a defence mechanism and without much conviction as a sop to this lobby. In fact, with its entire economic strategy tied in with attracting foreign capital, it will not want to encourage militant Islam and upset potential donors. By wanting to have its cake and eat it, the government may end up with nothing at all.

Is Pakistan likely to lurch towards activist Islam? The answer has to be a cautious no, at least for the foreseeable future. With all the changes taking place in Pakistan, ideas are in a state of flux, and an unarticulated debate is taking place below the surface.

On the one side, Pakistanis are being assaulted by all kinds of modern ideas through the media assault from the West and the sheer force of social change. This tide is impossible to stem, and offers an attractive alternative vision to the kind of sterile piety at the official level, or the unreasoned certainties of the Islamic extremists.

Meanwhile, the changes wrought by the Zia years have entrenched the religious groups and given them a taste of power and privilege. The effects of those years, however, are yet to be fully felt. As far as the other wider social changes, they have certainly encouraged the emergence of a more conservative, urbanised lobby. Today, even the rural areas are beginning to feel the effects of orthodoxy.

The maulvi lobby has shown itself capable of bringing people on to the streets on emotional, or sectarian grounds. The people of Pakistan may not be avid practising Muslims, but they feel strongly for their religion, especially if it is perceived to be under attack. But the religious parties' lack of organisation and unity, or any economic or social programme makes their protests sporadic and short-lived. Where for example was Maulana Noorani only two months after the Gulf war, which had made him a rallying point for the masses for a brief spell?

Perhaps the ambivalence Pakistanis feel towards orthodox Islam is a result of their basic pragmatism. The ideological vacuum at the political level has so far been filled by a desire for self improvement. For all their emotional attachment to religion, most Pakistanis are very much of this world—keen to get ahead in whatever way they can.

In politics, too, they are increasingly concerned with matters such as the construction bridges, roads and schools rather than larger ideological factors. The irony

is that the fervour of religious passions in Islam today is being dampened not so much by coherent arguments and appeals from secular forces. The strongest bastion against the religious right, simply by default, is the mundane kind of pragmatism that holds the country today in its thrall.

Shariah Laws Seen Threat to Individual Rights

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[Article by Azia Siddiqui: "From Here to Theocracy?"; quotation marks as published]

[Text] When the Quaid-i-Azam was once pressed by a delegation to enforce Shariah in the country he asked: "Whose Shariah? The Hanafi's, the Hanbali's, the Shafei's, the Maliki's, or the Jafferi's? I do not want to get involved. The minute I enter this field, the ulema will take over, for they claim to be the experts and I certainly don't wish to hand over the field to them. I am aware of their criticism but I don't propose to fall into their trap." Forty-odd years later, the rulers of the country look ominously en route to a destination that the founder of the country had wished to avoid. So much so, that a person like Sardar Assef Ahmed Ali, an IJI MNA [Islami Jamhoori Ittehad] [member of National Assembly], now appears more naive than brave in offering resistance to the mullahs. When the pack tears at him, not a whimper of support is heard from even those who had egged him on to start with.

Political expediencies were tempting enough in the years following Jinnah's death to define the fledgling state as a theocracy, but those who had inherited Jinnah's mantle could not depart too sharply from the direction he had set. The Objectives Resolution that came just six months later solemnly affirmed that all sovereignty belonged to Allah and that Muslims could now order their lives in accordance with Islamic teachings. At the same time, however, it also pledged the country to democracy, freedom, equality, tolerance, and social justice. It guaranteed the fundamental rights of the people and assured the minorities freedom of worship and a protection of all their legitimate interests.

The Basic Principles, later drafted for constitution-making, forbade the framing of any laws that were repugnant to Islam but again the determination of repugnancy was left to the legislature itself rather than to any 'experts' that the Quaid had been so wary about.

Another instance of how the executive successfully warded off pressure from the religious lobby in those turbulent days was the way in which the politically-motivated anti-Ahmediya agitation of 1953 came to naught. Although the movement was in part backed and financed by the Punjab government of the time, the centre was able—unlike the Z.A. Bhutto government of twenty years later—to ward off pressure even if that became one of the factors that led to the fall of the governments both in the provinces and at the centre.

Bhutto's surrender to the orthodoxy in 1974 marked the beginning of the country's irrevocable descent into the trap of pitting democracy against a religious interpretation of Pakistan's polity. It established the fact that the orthodoxy only needed to raise its stridency to a certain pitch in order to have its own way. The ban on liquor and the change of the weekend from Sunday to Friday might have been minor concessions but they were significant as gestures of appeasement made to the orthodoxy. Such appeasement, big or small, only whet their appetite for more.

And sure enough, that act set the stage for Zia's self-serving Islamisation and for the ascendancy, later on, of his so-called spiritual heirs to power. The consequences thereof have done little service to Islam or to the professors of this religion in Pakistan.

The worst affected by this drift have been women and minorities. The Hudood Ordinance of 1979, for one, has virtually removed the distinction between adultery and rape. The burden of proof lies on the rape victim and if she cannot provide this then it can only be interpreted as succumbing to adultery. Another discriminatory law was enforced by the Qisas and Diyat Ordinance of 1980 which provided for compensation money being paid to a victim of the heirs of someone who had been murdered or had sustained grave injuries. The law stipulated that only half the amount was to be paid if the victim was female. Meanwhile, the law of evidence made the evidence of a woman worth only half that of a man.

Another court decision with potentially far-reaching consequences for the women of Pakistan was the one in which the Shariat Appellate Bench of the Supreme Court ruled last July against certain provisions of the Family Laws Ordinance. According to this ruling, marriages and divorce no longer need be registered with Union Councils and in case of divorce, the Council's attempts at a reconciliation are considered beyond Islamic provisions and therefore invalid.

This move is being seen by some quarters as an attempt at making divorce arbitrary and multiple marriages far more easy for men. Women can rightly see in it a threat to the security of their homes and to their status in society in general. One possible misinterpretation of this being that a widow can be deprived of her inheritance if the other heirs proclaim that they were witness to her being divorced just before her husband died.

The orthodoxy has long been rearing to go at the Family Laws Ordinance. The present judgement may give it the fillip that it needed, and the courts may now find it difficult to resist the orthodox onslaught even though the Supreme Court recently ruled that it found nothing in the Ordinance that was repugnant to Islam.

The Constitution places the Muslim Personal Law as well as the Constitution itself beyond the jurisdiction of the Shariat court. The Appellate Bench, however, in the present case, derived its jurisdiction from the Objectives Resolution having been made a substantive part of the

constitution by General Zia. It is this bench, which gave the Shariat Courts powers to strike down whatever was, in its view, against Islam.

There have been changes in the law on qisas and diyat. The new law gives the victim or the heirs the right to inflict injuries identical to the ones sustained by the victim. But it allows the offenders to absolve themselves of the crime by paying blood money to the victim or to the heirs. That means, in effect, that rich people can get away even with willful murder.

A murderer can also be forgiven by the heirs of the victim and thus stand above the law. Anyone with enough resources or clout can easily obtain such forgiveness and then walk away scot-free. When Maulana Eisar Qasmi, an ASSP [Anjuman Sipahe Sahaba MNA [member of National Assembly]], was killed during a by-election campaign in Jhang last January, it led to retaliatory murders and then to widespread sectarian rioting in a number of neighbouring districts. Many more people were killed and wounded and a great deal of property was gutted. Later, the two parties defused tensions by each one forgiving the other, whereupon the court had to dismiss the cases and set all detainees free. What had all the people died for? And who was to answer for damage done to property in this sectarian fire?

The minorities too have borne the brunt of this so-called 'Islamisation.' The ban on Ahmedis against using any 'Islamic' nomenclature or symbols has led to dozens of them being arraigned in courts each month for 'crimes' such as inscribing 'Bismillah' or 'Mashaallah' on rings or on wedding cards. It was even being seriously argued in a court recently that an Ahmedi who brings up his child as a Ahmedi is guilty of preaching his faith and therefore deserving of severe punishment.

In making the Objectives Resolution a part of the constitution General Zia tampered with its wording to make the minorities' professing and practising their religion less free than originally pledged. He also made them into a separate electorate for all elections, thus effectively cutting them off from the political mainstream.

General Zia set up a parallel Shariat judiciary to try cases involving the Shariah and also to rule on the current laws' conformity with the Shariah. It was provided that the court's ruling over any law would automatically come into effect on the date fixed by the court if the necessary amendment had not been made before that. Thus the Federal Shariat Court has been invested with the power to strike down laws it considers to be out of conformity with Islam, or to amend them in whichever way it considers appropriate.

One law it has amended (section 295 C of the Penal Code, itself an invention of General Zia) is to delete the alternative of life imprisonment for insulting Prophet Mohammad, to mandatory death sentence for the offence. The change became effective from May last year

as laid down by the court, and it has already led to a flood of charges of blasphemy brought against a number of individuals.

In one instance, a youthful fanatic was so worked up by the campaign mounted against a Christian that he went and killed him with his own hand. The victim, Naimat Ahmar, was a schoolteacher in Faisalabad and a Punjabi poet of some standing. In another instance in Karachi, the accused turned out to be a business rival of the accuser. The case of Akhtar Hameed Khan, who has been similarly charged, and who has spent a lifetime in community development work, is still in the courts.

Another court ruling has caused problems for the minorities. It has been ruled that if a married non-Muslim converted to Islam, his or her marriage stood automatically annulled. This has led to a number of Christian men and women claiming conversion only in order to free themselves of their marital bonds and contract new marriages, or in order to obtain legality for their extra-marital relations.

Another controversial ruling of the Federal Shariat court has been the declaration that all interest is *riba* and therefore repugnant to Islam. This has thrown the government in a major quandary. It does not know how it can cut itself off from an international financial system based inextricably on interest. It has bought itself time by going into appeal, which the mullahs have already been denouncing as impudence against the holy writ. The knot is bound to get tighter.

The Shariat Act passed last year is yet to be followed up with necessary constitutional amendments and the ancillary new laws and institutions. It may mean enhanced interference of the state in the lives of the common people in the name of enforcement of Shariah's social, cultural and moral norms. The worse affected in any new bid at amending the constitution in order to bring it closer to a theocracy are again likely to be women and minorities, and the likeliest sources of dissent the press and the intellectual and creative classes. The making of Shariah, as interpreted by the mullahs, as the supreme law of the land will make the constitution and the legislators subsidiary to these so-called experts on Islam.

The "trap" that Jinnah had wished to side-step seems inexorably upon us. The present rulers look hell-bent on leading the people right into it.

Role of Islamic Schools in Islamization Viewed

93AS00651 Karachi HERALD in English 15 Sep 92
p 34

[Article by Talat Aslam: "The Madrassah Factor"; quotation marks, italicized words as published]

[Text] Anyone traveling across the country will not fail to notice the growth of the madrassah. In virtually every town with a population of over about 50,000, a madrassah has now become an essential part of the

landscape. These institutions come in a baffling array of styles, reflecting varying degrees of opulence. There are the older, more established madrassahs, usually located in the centre of major cities, which have a run down air about them. There are also the small rural madrassahs, which remain extremely spartan with a roof of some sort and rugs as their only props.

The rise of the madrassah can perhaps be seen as the most concrete manifestation of General Zia's legacy. Many of the more opulent structures were actually financed by foreign governments—the Saudis being the most profligate but with the Iranians, Libyans and Gulf states also known to generously contribute.

The rise of the madrassah can be traced back to the fortuitous coming together of three factors: General Zia's Islamisation, the Afghanistan crisis and the Iranian revolution. It was the panic that seized the more conservative Arab monarchies and other anti-Iran states about the possibility of the spread of Khomeini style revolutions that led to the bankrolling of all kinds of religious groups and institutions in Pakistan. The Iranians counter-attacked by funding their own allies within the religious ulema. The maulvis exploited this paranoia and benefited handsomely. The Afghan war also saw the Jamaat and JUI [Jamiat-i-Ulema-i-Pakistan] become heavily involved in the conflict. Some observers argue that funds for the Afghan cause from Arab countries was also diverted to the parties. One offshoot of this was the building of madrassahs. Another was the growth of sectarianism.

"If you look at where the most madrassahs were constructed you will realise that they form a wall blocking Iran off from Pakistan," says a Shia leader from Leiah. That may well be an overly dramatic way of putting it, but there is certainly a grain of truth in the statement. Balochistan, for example, was very generously granted funds for madrassahs, followed by rapid construction along the Indus through the length and breadth of the Seraiki belt.

This is not to say that other parts of the country remained immune from this trend. Today, virtually every part of the country has witnessed the rise and rise of the madrassah. Statistics about the growth of madrassahs are difficult to uncover, but Abbas Rashid quotes one interesting figure in his perceptive study on fundamentalism. At the time of the creation of Pakistan, there were a mere 137 madrassahs in the entire country. Today, a single large district in the Punjab is likely to have as many.

The impact of this phenomenal growth in madrassahs remains to be seen. One obvious, and increasingly visible, fallout is that the religious parties have been able to gain a pool of recruits and a vehicle for ready-made street power. In fact, many of the crowds that are mustered for protest demonstrations—such as during the Salman Rushdie affair—are drawn from the ranks of the madrassahs.

"The religious parties may not be growing in terms of popular support," argues Dr. Eqbal Ahmed "but the madrassahs have provided them with a potential constituency, and a pool of cadres, workers and martyrs."

The madrassah produces the qaris, imam masjids and religious teachers whose demand has grown rapidly since the Zia years, which saw the construction of countless new mosques. The system is not only self-perpetuating but thoroughly bureaucratised. One maulvi who administers a madrassah in Multan explains the process: "You now need a qualification from a registered madrassah to serve as an imam masjid, mashaikh or teacher in any establishment. We get regular circulars telling us about vacancies. Most of our graduates can get jobs."

The entry of 'trained and qualified' imams in mosques has made a great difference, raising the ideological temperature and politicising the atmosphere through *khutbas*. This in turn has encouraged sectarianism, as the madrassahs rigidly play up the importance of their sect and down grade all others. "The free market has entered the madrassah, and the competition is high for recruits. Sectarianism, therefore, is encouraged as a tactic, says a Lahore intellectual wryly.

But what exactly does a typical madrassah teach its students? The curriculum in most such institutions, which offer courses that can last for as long as 16 years, is purely theological. "The system is not even medieval," argues Dr. Eqbal Ahmed. "At least the medieval madrassahs taught algebra, geometry, philosophy, aesthetics, trigonometry, chemistry, astronomy, anatomy, history, the study of customs and so forth. All this is missing from the curriculum of our madrassahs." What then is the content? "Students are basically tutored in reciting the Quran, in fiqh (the interpretation of Shariah) and Ihtisaal (censorship). They emerge from the institutions completely incapable of fitting into normal society. The likelihood is that unable to fit into society as it exists, these students will want a society where they could be useful," says one Lahore based academic.

The narrow focus of the madrassahs, some people fear, is designed to negate any dynamic interpretation of questioning Islam. In fact, it is bound to foster its opposite—totalitarian Islam. This form of Islam has a wide appeal, as it offers simple answers to extremely complex problems. In the words of Dr. Eqbal Ahmed, this brand of Islam "thrives on alienation and ignorance, commoditizes our society is producing in great abundance."

Government Criticized for Bankrupting Tax Policies

93AS0109A Islamabad *THE MUSLIM in English*
21 Oct 92 p 6

[Article: "Driving the Country to the Brink of Bankruptcy"]

[Text] How the very basics of social and economic justice are alien to the character of the present government of Pakistan is demonstrated by the manner in which it levies and collects taxes. A study by a staffer reveals the most repelling nature of financial management of the country. In plain words, this IJI [Islami Jamhoori Ittehad] government is of, for and by the rich. It has no concept of socio-economic fairplay. The salaried classes, that is the lowest to the middle classes are the only ones who pay their taxes. Most of these exactions are collected by this Shylockian state structure even before the wage-earner has touched his own hard earned money. The ex-source deduction of income tax ensures that the State receives its cut before the worker actually receives his meagre salary. It must be stated that apart from the fact that the carry-home packet for the average worker is getting lighter and lighter with the spiralling inflation. The sky-rocketing prices of consumer goods and domestic services have already reached what are truly the back-breaking levels. Wheat flour, the staple food of the average Pakistani wage-earner was never so highly priced in the history of this land as today. The same is true of pulses, green grocery, meats, eggs, sugar, fuel, electricity. So many different and mostly deviously imposed levies are now part of the electricity bill that its arrival is a stunning shock every month. The lucky ones who own a telephone know how a single call costs almost as much as a worker's day's meal. In most cases, the government of Pakistan has imposed taxes and other levies in what is very nearly a fraudulent tactic. There is no express sanction from the National Assembly. What the government did—and our sleepy MNAs [members of National Assembly] failed to detect—was to tag a tiny clause to the Finance Bill which gave government omnibus powers to impose taxes without having to obtain the legislature's prior sanction. This may be legal in a strictly formal sense but to the extent that this kind of device is a deliberate effort to circumvent the spirit of the law, it is immoral.

While the wage-earners are under a crushing burden of direct and indirect taxation, the fat ones—the feudals and the excessively pampered industrialists, traders and business owners—are receiving concession upon concession in the garb of "investment incentives." On the one hand the wage-earner is being asked to pay more and more, the fabulously rich are being favoured with gifts. But this is not really the core of the scandal which the entire tax administration today is. The ones who ought to be paying millions in taxes—even if all the allowance is made for the so-called tax holidays, investment incentives, a variety of rebates on one excuse or another—just do not pay their taxes in full or on time. In the first place,

there are such huge and wide loopholes in the tax laws pertaining to corporate bodies that any smart income tax adviser can help his whale of a client escape the net, with the Central Board of Revenue [CBR] looking the other way. That is, when the CBR, in its present mental attitude, is not actually assisting the tax dodger. Then, there is the whole network of corruption which has perforated the structure of tax collection apparatus.

Authentic and duly authorised figures of tax collection during the 1989-92 period tell a frightening story. Except for the taxes collected from the salaried class, almost all other sources of tax have shown an alarming decline. The bigger the sources of tax realisation, the steeper the decline in tax yield. Some of these falls in tax collection are simply inexplicable except as cases of stark inefficiency compounded by corruption. For instance, collection of central excise duty on natural gas till September 1992 was a mere Rs [Rupees] 100 million, recording a decline of as much as 23.4 percent over the figure of last year. How is this to be justified? Or, the fall of 27.2 percent in the receipts of Iqra surcharge? Or the 21.8 percent shrinkage in the yield from import duties? The study also reveals that indirect taxes including sales tax, import-related taxes and the like showed a decline of 21.6 percent upto September 30 this year. There is, thus, an epidemic of falling receipts from those sources of taxes which ought to have been showing notable increases. If this means anything, the IJI government has performed a miracle of the most depressing kind.

Apart from the fact that this record shows the present federal administration's inefficiency and ineffectiveness, there is a major issue of socio-economic and moral justice. Why is it that the hapless salaried classes, already overburdened with the twin menace of inflation and increasing levies, should be left to stew in their own juice while those who can and ought to pay for the maintenance of political order entirely in their favour, should be allowed to evade taxes on a stupendous scale? This is an issue of far greater moral import than monetary. What we have is a government whose socio-economic orientation is totally devoid of fairplay. There is no trace of any principled planning or sense of balance. If this trend of falling tax returns is allowed to go unchecked, very soon the federal government would be hovering on the brink of bankruptcy. Not a very happy thought.

Shortage of Skilled Workers Said Hurting Economy

93AS0065D Lahore *THE NATION in English*
27 Sep 92 p 6

[Article by Ghani Eirabie: "Why Worker Shortage Amidst Massive Unemployment?"; italicized words as published]

[Text] It is one of the paradoxes of our economic life that while facing one of the highest unemployment rates of the Third World, we experience acute shortages of such semi-skilled workers as masons, carpenters, ironsmiths,

painters and electricians. On the one hand, it is satisfying to presume a pace of economic development that is absorbing all plying of the trade, but on the other, it is disturbing to find all around us evidence of massive unemployment. This evidence is not confined to blue-collar jobs; equally there is a shortage of stenographers, accountants, laboratory assistants and electronic-repairmen.

We need to investigate whether the explanation lies in our congenital lassitude or social bias or lack of training opportunities; whatever the reason, we ought to make an early move to eliminate the anomalies, for not only are the existing maladjustments causing avoidable hardship to our people but also hampering the pace of our economic growth. We never tire of stressing the urgency of industrialising, but are not acquiring the skills required to sustain it.

Again, while vexing eloquent on the natural talent of our workers and their inherent commitment to hard work, we need pose to ourselves some embarrassing questions; and these are: why are the Gulf employers turning increasingly to workers from Sri Lanka, South Korea or the Philippines in preference to ours? Or how come we prefer "foreign-assembled" Suzukis—as we once preferred "foreign-assembled" Opels—to the same cars assembled in Pakistan itself. When the car engines and bodies are the same and the parts are the same, the only difference is made by the way our workers put them together. Is this difference due to lack of skill or want of commitment?

We need to look into it in national self-interest. For instance, managerial control over the Suzuki car manufacturing plant in Karachi has this week been bought back by the Japanese reportedly because of their dissatisfaction with the quality of production and the inflated cost of it. The German owners of Opel were said to be equally unhappy. Gulf entrepreneurs allegedly have complained of Pakistani labour losing their interest in work after a year or two in the job and replacing it by deeper involvement in union activity. Whatever the truth, we should take cognizance of it.

We also need take cognizance of the complaint that the cost of imports at Karachi port shoots up by 180 percent because of the exploitative labour charges of dock workers unloading ships. It is claimed that the highly organised dock workers make anything up to Rs [Rupees] 10,000 per month when they are not unloading a ship and almost twice that much when they are. Similarly, the National Steel Mills at Karachi allegedly continues to show losses and produce substandard steel primarily because of trade unionism having run riot. The inordinate greed of a few is damaging the prospects of many in the days to come by frightening away would be investors. Again, the insistence of PIA [Pakistan International Airlines], NPT [National Press Trust] and PTV [Pakistan Television] employees and others on payment of a bonus even when the organisation shows no profit is grossly unfair. Any trade unionism that takes no interest

in improving the productivity of the enterprise or the performance of the employees but concerns itself exclusively with its "pound of flesh" both violates the ethics of the trade union movement and hampers rapid economic development of the nation.

The question that suggests itself is: why do we tolerate inefficiency, corruption or hooliganism in a society that is surplus in workers, both educated and uneducated? We could easily get replacements, not by importing them from abroad, but finding them within the country, which has no shortage of deserving people—competent, clean and disciplined. All that we need do is to streamline the method of recruitment to ensure the entry of the best—from the point of view of education, training and character. Weeding out the corrupt, the incompetent or the rowdy would be neither immoral nor unpatriotic, for the replacements would be from within the country, and employing the deserving would be more moral and more patriotic.

And there would be no public outcry if the weeding process complies with due process of law and the new recruits are recognisably superior in performance and character to those ousted. It is the suspicion of unfairness and arbitrariness in removal and recruitment that breeds resentment within and provokes condemnation without. Even those of us favouring restoration of the constitutional provision protecting government servants do not oppose elimination of the corrupt and the incompetent after the due process of law.

State obligation also extends to provision of adequate training facilities not only for those choosing to become civil servants, doctors, engineers or bankers, but also for those wanting to become masons, carpenters, merchants, drivers and electricians; or accountants, stenographers, paramedics and lab assistants. In fact, the provision for training in the various trades should be made a part of the academic curriculum. For instance, training for the first category of trades should be integrated into the primary and secondary schools and of the second, into secondary and high schools. Taking cognizance of our requirements as a developing Third World country, we should begin to give a distinct vocational bias to all our pre-college education (and to the sciences and the professions in the colleges) in departure from the present pre-occupation with so-called liberal arts education. And to make vocational training attractive, we should bend over backwards to eliminate whatever social prejudice might still be attaching to the more earthly vocations.

However, it is more important to convince the country's workforce that their market-value would sharply increase if they acquire proficiency in some trade. No matter where they learn it—in a vocational school or in their native village from the local *mistri* or from their family elders—it will stand them in good stead in their quest for a job. Similarly, the employment prospects of the educated young men would improve if they supplemented their liberal arts education with skills in short-hand or typing, proofreading or computer-operating,

photography or lab analysis. There is a tremendous demand in the country today for those who know how to drive a tractor, repair a harvester, or domestic appliances or improve the performance of radio and television sets, rewind an electric motor or tune up a car engine, or tailor a suit. Even as they wait for a job, they could acquire a skill or learn a trade. This would not only facilitate our people getting a job here or abroad, but also help them set up small businesses of their own. We have to shed our complex that there is something degrading about being an artisan; far from it; if anything, there is nothing more degrading than being a worker without a skill.

We hear a lot of government projects, financed by both domestic and foreign funds, designed to impart vocational training, but few of us have ever come across a mason or a carpenter, a motor mechanic or a TV repairman, trained in any of these institutions. Which raises the suspicion they probably exist only on paper or operate too erratically. Be that as it may, the government need take a close look at the urgency of expanding facilities for vocational training in a variety of trades, both traditional and modern, and so locate them, especially in small towns or in the suburbs of big cities, that the largest possible number of people can benefit from them. They should be state-run institutes charging only nominal fees. They could be financed out of *Iqra* funds or *zakat* collections; the investment in the future of the poor would be fully justified.

Not many sociologists have taken much notice of the fact that there is as wide a gulf between the "haves" and the "have-nots" within the labour force as between the workers and the employers; and there is equal need to bridge both gulfs.

This is best illustrated by the emoluments of the Karachi dock workers who make probably as much in one month as ordinary labourers do in a year in a grain market in Faisalabad, at a construction site in Islamabad or on a PWD [Public Works Department] project in Lahore. Even within the same factory, say railway loco-shop, the labour union office-holders draw probably twice as much as their voters for doing half the work, if that. In the Karachi Steel Mills, while the ordinary worker trudges to the factory or squeezes into an overcrowded vehicle, their chief bargaining agent reportedly commands a fleet of a dozen cars and other vehicles to commute in state to his office in the factory. The union leaders, in the manner of our politicians, try to sustain themselves in power with high rhetoric appealing to the baser emotions of a mob. All the three institutions listed here show how strong and prosperous trade unions fail to underwrite the economy profitability of the plants operated by the union members.

This is not to make a case for banning the unions, but only to suggest reorientation of union objectives, relating rights to obligations, emoluments to profits; and denying protection to workers who are incompetent, corrupt or undisciplined. In fact, retention of such workers

amounts to flagrant violation of the rights of the workers who are competent, clean and disciplined but are jobless. This is not only unfair to them but also to the national economy which at this stage of development requires maximum productive input by everyone. For Pakistan, the example to follow is, Taiwan, Singapore or Malaysia—and not the United States or U.K., which have already made their economic breakthrough. We cannot afford the luxury of reckless trade unionism, not yet at least.

Nor can an impoverished underdeveloped country like ours afford the luxury of pursuing purposeless higher education in liberal arts. We need devote our colleges to the teaching of the sciences and the professions, and impart a marked vocational bias to learning in our school system. We also need set up a chain of training centres for artisans across the land to meet our basic requirements, to reduce the burden of unemployment and to give a fillip to our economic development.

Economic Incentives Prescribed for Sindh Economy

93AS0065C Lahore THE NATION in English
29 Sep 92 p 6

[Article by Ikram Sehgal: "Sindh Situation: Economic Initiatives"; italicized words as published]

[Text] To revive the Sindh economy, pragmatic and bold initiatives must begin with Karachi, which is not only the prime city of Sindh but that of Pakistan, being its only port. Karachi remained economically buoyant during the 70s because of a construction boom fuelled primarily by expatriate funds from the Middle East. While the money for housing is still there, the lack of water and power has rendered housing starts to virtually nothing. Consequently, a large percentage of the traditional labour force is unemployed, the residual effects spiralling upwards and cutting into white-collar jobs. The net result has been an economic downturn of enormous proportion that has degenerated into (1) ethnic strife as the population has increased but the economic cake has become smaller, (2) deterioration of law and order as the jobless have turned to crime, and (3) consequently residual political factors breeding a general state of anarchy. This has been further accentuated by the machinations of RAW [Research and Analysis Wing] (the terror arm of India), drugs and arms proliferation, activities of armed militants of various political parties, dacoits from the interior seeking kidnap victims from richer urban areas rather than their traditional rural hunting grounds, etc. To complicate the economic scene, entire industries have shifted northwards to safer havens, deepening the unemployment crisis.

The prime factor compounding this situation is the presence of anything between 750,000 and 1 million illegal Bangladeshi immigrants (an increase of 1,000 percent since 1980) that have wholesale taken away a large percentage of blue-collar jobs in industries while

completely dominating the domestic employment sector. Industrialists all over the world prefer illegal immigrants because they can get away paying much less than the minimum wages, giving no facilities whatsoever, and as they cannot form unions or protest, be free from that "problem." Industrialists in Karachi have "unofficial" police protection in local police station arrangements not only to look the other way but also have political "dissenter" deported without causing any ripples. While one is sympathetic towards the humanitarian aspects of the Bangladeshi illegal immigrants, particularly their long, tortuous journey to Pakistan, by their taking over critical jobs they have contributed immensely to the anarchy in Karachi. Their free movement across India in large numbers on such an organised basis is suspect and has been encouraged by RAW in trying to destabilise Pakistan. One may well ask how did they succeed when the stranded Pakistanis failed? It would be well-nigh impossible to attempt to repatriate all illegal immigrants, particularly those engaged as workers in industry without causing those industries to close down because of the lack of alternate cheap labour. However, the people of Pakistan must get some premium for the use of illegal immigrants by our captains of industry. First of all, these illegal immigrants must be immediately registered and given some sort of an identification which confirms their alien status. A monthly tax of Rs [Rupees] 250 or Rs. 3,000 per year should be deducted at source from their pay packets, the concerned industrialist making up the difference if they are not paid the minimum wage. They are using the civic facilities of Karachi as well as depriving genuine Pakistanis of employment. The fund of about Rs. 3 billion collected annually could be used to modernise/renovate the dilapidated socio-economic structure of Karachi and provide training in higher skills for the Pakistanis thus deprived of employment. Side by side with due registration, which should be made mandatory for industrialists (and household owners employing illegal immigrants as domestic servants), further illegal immigration must be stopped. There is no use in creating jobs if it is going to be taken up by non-Pakistanis.

The first priority for Karachi is water in supersession of all other requirements. A city of 9 million people needs potable water primarily for drinking and hygienic purpose. The lack of water has resulted in housing starts coming to almost a complete halt. While there are many schemes in the works for bringing water from the Indus, it is high time that we worked actively for a chain of desalination plants along the coastal belt, with the main emphasis being in Karachi at the outset, with one such 5-10 MGD plant each at Port Qasim, Korangi, DHA and Hawkes Bay, giving us between 30 and 40 MGD of water. With those commensurately expensive but "tactically" sited desalination plants, there will be a boost to construction in adjacent areas, thus breaking the job logjam. Since these areas are at the tail-end of the water tap line, there will be less loss of transient water as well as freeing some water for the centre of the city, which also needs high-rise office and apartment buildings.

Alongside the requirement of water, the next priority is power. The 1200 MW Hub Scheme, likely to come on stream in the next six or seven years, should give a big boost. However, it would be appropriate to combine power with water desalination plants. This would provide interim and badly needed power. To combat systematic power pilferage running into billions of rupees annually, a more effective inspection organisation within KESC [Karachi Electric Supply Corporation] has to be created. Other than the power to industry being lost to consumers, the extra revenue meant for development work is also lost at the same time. The net result is that or power distribution lines are in a shambles and mostly corroded. By designating residential and industrial sectors along the coastal belt for being served by private sector electricity, both the efficiency and revenue collection will increase.

There is an immediate need to create jobs away from Karachi, though in the immediate vicinity or nearabouts. Port Qasim must be developed as a full-fledged free trade zone, but real estate speculators must be kept away like the plague. The old city of Thatta must be developed as a model metropolitan city, but care must be taken that ethnic Sindhis have the first right to residential, commercial and industrial schemes. They must also be given due access to financing for industrial and commercial ventures. The coastal road from Karachi to Gwadar will ensure that Ormara, Pasni, Gwadar and numerous locations en route can be developed as free trade zone localities with adjacent port facilities. The emphasis must be to create employment opportunities away from Karachi and to take care that illegal immigrants do not frustrate the scheme to provide jobs to genuine Pakistanis.

Economic initiatives cannot be successful unless we commensurately tackle the sorry state of Karachi's civic infrastructure, such as telecommunications, sewerage, transportation, medical care, education, police services, etc. Both Karachi and Hyderabad need to be divided into manageable districts of about 1 million population each, with a Mayor looking after municipal functions. To coordinate the cities' function, each city, having several Mayors, needs an overall Supremo Lieutenant-Governor. There should be a direct relationship between taxation and spending, so that the people are satisfied that what they contribute to the public exchequer is seen as development in their own localities with respect to public facilities.

Unless the Land Reform Laws are implemented in letter and spirit, the economy of the rural areas will remain mortgaged to the avarice of *waderas*, whose lifestyle is quite a world apart from their impoverished tenants, who work the land but are burdened with burgeoning loans they have to take from landowners and moneylenders year after year at exorbitant interest to eke out a livelihood. To whatever political party they owe their allegiance and despite vociferous claims, most of these landowners are neither democratic nor nationalist. They

have ensured that the civil administration is total subservient to their needs and have thus frustrated any reforms. Since they get elected as the "representatives" of the people, they ensure that such laws as are inimical to their vested interests are never framed. Most of the ills bedeviling Sindh society can be traced to them. This may be true of all provinces. In Sindh the coercion that this elite class exerts for its vested interests is much more pronounced and borders on outright crime.

In the rural areas it is extremely necessary to have industrial estates adjacent to every big town and city, i.e., free trade zones (FTZs) next to towns like Badin, Nawabshah, Dadu, Mirpurkhas, Shikarpur, Jacobabad, Khairpur, etc., with trade and financial incentives given to encourage investment. Sindh has a very high proportion of both educated and uneducated jobless youth as much as we must accommodate the urban area unemployed, we must not forget to give the ethnic Sindhi economic opportunity at his/her doorstep in the rural areas. By reversing the human traffic from cities to rural areas and encouraging agri-based industries with adequate incentives, the whole economic situation will be changed positively. Adequate and pragmatic legislation must ensure that the ethnic Sindhi benefits from the economic largesse by being a functioning part of every potential business. The ethnic Sindhi must be forcibly integrated into the economic mainstream of Pakistan. It is only when he has ownership stakes will he (or she) become a contributing rather than a reluctant citizen of Pakistan.

The masses expected that among other things the army would solve their socio-economic problems beginning with water and electricity. If the lack was not so serious, one would consider this mass aspiration to be funny. It is not the Army's job to provide socio-economic or civic facilities, it is the duty of the political and civil administration. To a great extent the army has created conditions suited to economic development by improving the law and order environment, but this will deteriorate as soon as the army pulls out unless political compromise is reached between the warring parties and factions. Immediate and positive dialogue is necessary. Only death and devastation are the alternatives to dialogue and compromise. Our political leaders must eschew personal egos and interests, taking their cue from the continuing horror of Eastern Europe. It is also up to the masses to correctly choose their leaders, those who will really lead them to prosperity, not those who will lead them to destruction, because they lack the foresight to overcome their personal aggrandisement and profit motivation.

Economic initiatives are necessary, the army can (and has) provided the basic environment, but cannot go beyond that stage. That is the domain of political leadership, who are now on short notice to show their real mettle or remove themselves from the path of progress and prosperity of the people of Sindh in particular and that of Pakistan in general.

Former COAS Discusses Role of Armed Forces

93AS0109C Islamabad *THE MUSLIM* in English
21 Oct 92 p 7

[Article by Mirza Aslam Beg: "Role of Armed Forces in Developing Countries"]

[Text] The character of the armed forces is an important factor in determining their role, which differs according to the peculiar threat environments and different psycho-social imperatives of countries. Geography, past history, traditions and the intensity of nationalistic feelings are some of the important determinants. There is no generalised formula which could be applicable to all.

There are armies which have grown out of revolutions, such as those of Algeria, China, Vietnam and Iran, drawing their sustenance from the revolutionary spirit. Their outlook is forward looking and pragmatic. The concept of the ruler and the ruled does not exist in their scheme of things. On the other hand, many of the armed forces in the developing countries have grown out of colonial traditions and are generally detached from people creating the mentality of rulers versus the slaves. Countries which follow the system of conscription, have the advantage, in that it helps them to bring the military and the civil closer to each, thus minimising the chances of military take-over. The compelling reasons for intervention and take-over had been different in different situations, but a common denominator in most cases has been the "segmented societies where political parties look after their own interests and the ineffectiveness and corruption of the politicians allow the military to intervene and take over power at 'low risk.'"

The purpose of this enquiry is to identify the causes of conflict between the role and character of the armed forces in the developing countries, which leads to frequent intervention and military take-over. Obviously this phenomenon has caused much damage to the development of free democratic societies. The identification of causes would help in recommending remedial measures as safeguard against such interventions.

In peace time, armed forces prepare themselves over the years for war which breaks out only rarely, and the period of actual hostilities is therefore generally short lived. The conduct of armed forces is governed more by internal environments than by external factors of threat. Armed forces being a powerful national institution, get drawn into the country's politics and get involved in internal matters which is beyond the call of their duty. Our own past experience reflects the army's active involvement in our political affairs.

As regards meeting internal threats, the size, quality and the operational preparedness of the armed forces alone is no guarantee for national security. In the recent past, the well-equipped and the large armed forces of Iran could not hold against internal turmoil. Similarly, Soviet armed forces disintegrated when internal chaos assumed

insurmountable proportions. Nevertheless, they continue to function, dealing with different crisis situations and the more such responsibilities fall upon the armed forces, the more it erodes the authority of the civil government and enhances the possibilities of military intervention.

Most of the Third World countries are forced by circumstances to maintain large armed forces beyond their means as safeguard against external threats. Countries like Pakistan, Iran, Turkey, Egypt, Syria, Thailand and Korea, etc., face such military threats. Countries having no immediate threat, maintain small armed forces. Australia is a continent but maintains very small armed forces. So is the case with island states like Indonesia and the Philippines. The factor of geography, therefore, to a great extent, determines the nature and size of threat. Some countries, which possess large reserves of strategic material, such as oil in the Middle East, face serious external threat, and those who do not have the capacity to defend themselves, seek external help to underwrite their security. Many of the African and Latin American countries, who do not enjoy such strategic importance, but do raise large armies to meet their security needs, get involved in frequent military take-overs, creating a state of instability and turmoil in the region.

India maintains the fourth largest armed forces in the world, not against any real threat of external aggression, but for the aggrandisement of their nationalistic urge to emerge as the inheritors of Ashoka's Empire if not the British Empire. Such ambitions have been the cause of several wars, tension and turmoil in the subcontinent over the last forty-five years. Under these conditions, Pakistan has been forced to maintain a force level which goes beyond its means, exerting pressure internally as well as externally, with serious repercussions on national security.

Generally speaking, in a situation of military take-over, the "acquired role" of the armed forces, in most of the developing countries, tends to gain permanency where the "regular army" is in support. Such has been the case in Pakistan, Thailand, Korea, Burma, Egypt, Bangladesh, etc. The peculiar psyche of the regular armed forces differs from the revolutionary and conscript armies which remain closer to public sentiments and help in blocking military take-over. India is the only exception, where the regular army has not intervened politically. There are three main reasons. Firstly, the institution of democracy has been able to establish traditional values to find solutions to the problems before they get out of control. Secondly, the country is too large, with divergent political and social cultures, to be brought under military control at once. What happens in Kashmir and Punjab does not affect the people in the south, east, or west. Thirdly, the very composition of the armed forces, with its multi-ethnicity, religious and cultural differences, makes it difficult to quickly change posture to support a move for military take-over.

In Afghanistan, the armed forces traditionally have played a very marginal role against external threats. Against foreign aggression, they always have melted away, leaving the task to the armed tribals to defeat aggression. Internal stability, political and military balance has traditionally been maintained by the armed tribals including some living in Pakistan. The present conflict in Afghanistan has developed because of the desire of the present leadership to create a "military force" to control Kabul and Afghanistan, which is being opposed by the armed tribals, who are now bigger and stronger than the earlier days. They are demanding their traditional right to determine the form of government in Kabul and the authority to govern Afghanistan.

Causes of Military Intervention

National cohesion is the prerequisite to national security. Weak domestic policies and political disorder, pave the way for military take-over. An internally divided country presents "a society in which no political institutions or leaders are accepted as legitimate, and as such cannot be the arbiters of group conflict. The politics of such a society is formless, because it is neither sustained by strong sentiments, nor by strong social forces. The military serves as a substitute of social forces, which actually do not exist." Military involvement in the political life of new nations is the direct consequence of the weakness of civilian political institutions. The military is motivated to intervene because by comparison with other bureaucratic and professional groups, it has the advantage of a good organisational structure.

Also useful in this civil-military discourse are the motives and moods that underlie the tendency of the military to intervene. These motives are: "the notion of manifest destiny of the soldiers," the "national interest," "class, regional, corporate interest of the armed forces for autonomy," and "individual self-interest for social advancement." Military involvement in politics also depends upon the "opportunity to intervene." This is created by increased civilian dependence on the military in the fields of foreign and even domestic policy, and the enhanced popularity of the military at a time when public confidence in civilian leadership and political process is on the decline.

The level of political culture; the degree of public attachment to and involvement in civilian institutions in a polity is an important factor. This determines the opportunity to and the likelihood of success of military intervention. The degree to which military intervention can succeed is therefore determined by the level of political culture. In countries with mature political culture, all the above conditions are normally fulfilled, and public legitimization for military intervention would not be obtainable. In those countries, the civil institutions are highly developed as are civil procedures and public authorities. As a result, there would be strong public resistance to the military rule in those societies. In societies with low political culture, the same criteria are in dispute. In addition, the public is relatively narrowly and weakly

organised, and public opinion is divided. Here the legitimization of military rule would be fluid. In countries of minimal political culture, the politically articulate actors of society are few and weakly organised, and the government can in effect ignore public opinion. The legitimization of military rule would thus be almost unimportant.

Military elites have similar interests as civilian elites—the enhancement of their economic and political positions, and even in some cases, even articulating similar ideological goals. These interest lead them in most cases to support social structures which assign minimal popular participation. Governments dominated by the military are the least likely to respond to the needs of the poor majority in the developing world. The military is normally willing to use force much more frequently than civilian dominated government to repress popular demands.

The authoritarianism of the military is primarily dependent on the organisational characteristics. Specific forms of the profession, with their emphasis on efficiency, coordination and subordination, can be assumed to put premium on the authoritarian rather than democratic attitudes. Often, the problem in civil-military relations is the military's impatience with the intolerance of the slower and not infallible process of democratic consultation as consensus building. Added to this, the military mind is politically conservative.

The Profile of Military Rule

The military which assumes power with broader objectives embarks upon introducing a programme of reforms. This comprises steps to eradicate corruption and nepotism in society, measures to ensure economic development, and a viable political system for the future. There are all lofty aims but the real test begins when practical measures are undertaken to achieve these objectives. The contribution of 'real politik' makes it abundantly clear that without striking compromises, affairs of the state cannot be run smoothly. Forced by circumstances, the army feels obliged to make adjustments with the civil services. Initially, the military leaders express their determination to weed out corruption and nepotism from civil services and they take some practical steps, too, in that direction. However, very soon, they realise that if such measures were taken to their extreme, the survival of the military regime would be in severe jeopardy. They face another difficulty as well. Usually, the military finds itself handicapped to run the administration of the state without help of the bureaucracy. The bureaucracy, though not favourably disposed towards the military rule, however, cannot disregard the wishes of the military all the time. Both need each other, and in the final analysis, this leads to marriage of convenience, between the two.

The military regime is beset with problems while implementing progressive measures. As time passes, military leaders find it extremely difficult to introduce radical changes in the society. Then, the bitter truth dawns on

them that they cannot eradicate the influence of the traditional wielders of power without compromising their own position. The process of compromises, once set in motion, knows no bounds and things go from bad to worse. Loud claims notwithstanding, the economic performance of the military regimes is generally no better than their civilian counterparts. For example, the regimes of President Ayub and President Zia produced short-term 'uneven' and 'undistributive' economic growth, coupled with heavy dependence on foreign investment and aid.

Generally speaking, military regimes do not stay in office for too long. Military coups cannot effectively tackle the myriad problems facing the developing nations. They may tide over political instability for a transitional period and introduce certain social and economic reforms, and accelerate the pace of economic growth but they fail to tackle the real problem of creating a viable political framework, which would function independently, without using the umbrella of military hierarchy. Military leaders, generally believe in ad hoc measures and seldom aim at long-term political development.

Internal contradictions of the military rulers are thoroughly exposed when they assume political power. Generally, military rulers prefer to maintain the status quo rather than arriving at some permanent solution to a problem. Lacking in administrative skill and political experience, they find it difficult to solve political problems. Although they claim to have the expertise to govern, they fail to deliver the goods. They hardly encourage political institutions to grow as they are adverse to the political process. Their goal from the outset seems the elimination of politics.

Performance of military rulers at institution-building is always low. For instance, the institution which President Ayub Khan created failed both structurally and functionally. It could not get substantial legitimacy in the country as a whole. Similarly, Zia-ur-Rehman in Bangladesh succeeded only in institutionalising strong authoritarian presidential system through a pseudo-democratic process. The limits of the military rules to ensure participation, continuity and social economic justice, remains a distant cry in the military set-up.

Realising that the ultimate success of a military regime depends on promoting the role of effective civilian institutions, the military leaders perforce introduce them having different nomenclatures in different countries i.e. "Basic Democracy," in Pakistan, "Guided Democracy" in Egypt and "Gram Sarkar" and "Upzila" or local bodies in Bangladesh. This indicates their desire to introduce partially representative institutions. Also, it keeps all those elements satisfied who helped them assume and maintain power.

On their assumption of power, the military leaders do not necessarily receive support from all sections of society. So, the prevailing political milieu compels them to join hands with the bureaucracy and adopt the same

tactics which are usually employed by the political leaders. This process of striking compromises results in the decline of efficiency and eventually tarnishes the earlier image of the military for incorruptibility. This produces an imbalance between inputs and outputs. Pakistan being one of the developing countries has been subjected to periodic military rule. The military option has been invoked in such quick succession that it has become a regular part of Pakistan's political process. On twice occasions, so far, the military has intervened overtly and imposed martial law in October 1958, March 1969 and July 1977—justifying its extreme action on grounds of chaotic conditions prevailing in the country.

What emerges from this discourse on civil-military relations is that none of the existing theories is universally applicable, even in the narrow context of the developing world. Not all Third World militaries are inherited from the colonial period, as in the cases of Ethiopia and Thailand. Not all military institutions are conservative institutions. What is perhaps an area of major concern, is the common tendency of the military to overstay in civilian politics, and the way in which its intervention impinges upon institutions of popular expression and lastly its capacity to deliver basic social-economic services to the ordinary citizenry. What defines military intervention or a military regime is not a military coup *e'tat* but by the degree of intervention.

The endemic phenomenon of military rule in most of the developing countries has become almost a normal feature. Democracy in these countries has proved to be a charade now, the armed forces becoming an integral part of the developing nation's political system. They no longer remain aloof from the political happenings. The varying roles that they play in politics range from minimal legitimate influence through recognised channels by virtue of their position and responsibilities within the political system, to the other extreme of total displacement of the civilian government in the form of overt military intervention in politics.

Until the nineteenth century, the thinking of political scientists reflected the traditional assumption of the military as something of an alien force that did not interact with other social groups but simply acted against them. The military itself was regarded as being partially or wholly undemocratic. But the traditional view that the military's participation in politics is necessarily perverse, has had to change under pressure of reality. It is now recognised that the armed forces and civilian politics are often intertwined, and that armies are only partially encapsulated institutions set apart from politics even when not directly intervening.

The most conspicuous model of civil-military relations in developing states is the praetorian model. In the post-War War II era, developing countries experienced varying levels of military intervention and erosion of democracy, and the coup zone had largely been confined to African, Asian and Latin American states. In these countries, in comparison to the developed countries, the

armed forces were more likely than not to be among the potential contenders for political power. Military intervention was characteristically associated with the less developed countries which are sometime referred to as "praetorian societies" or praetorian civil-military type characterised by ineffective political leadership and lack of instruments and structures to a channelised political support. "In a praetorian system, there is the absence of effective political institutions capable of mediating, refining and moderating group political actions." Social forces confront each other squarely: no political institutions and no corps or professional political leaders are recognised and accepted as the legitimate intermediaries to moderate group conflict. Each group employs means which reflect its peculiar nature and capabilities to decide upon office and policy. The techniques of military intervention are simply more effective than the other.

Recommendations

A balanced approach to maintain harmony between the security needs against internal and external threats is essential, which the armed forces alone cannot guarantee. Hence, the need to develop all the elements of national power, to evolve a balanced economic, political, and military order, as the guarantee for national security. Once the 'balance' is achieved, the system which a country adopts for itself, would lend faith and respect to it. What matters most is a society sustained by strong political culture, democratic sentiments and strong social forces.

Weak domestic policies and political disorder pave the way for military intervention. As also, increased civilian dependence on the military in the field of domestic policy, provide the 'opportunity to intervene.' Hence the need to strengthen the political institutions, founded on the bedrock of the 'culture of dialogue and dissent' as the key features of healthy democratic order. This would help provide education to develop respect for the political institutions and the leaders, as well as respect for other national institutions which together help sustain national cohesion and security.

Partly, solution to our problems lie in the political education of our military leadership who must understand the root cause of our malaise. Political understanding and education would help develop respect for the political system and actions would be guided more by convictions and commitment than by whims, and the responses from the military leadership would be more positive.

With regard to our civil-military relations, we follow a traditional bureaucratic attitude, leading to a communication gap between the civil and the armed forces. This gap is to be bridged for better understanding and harmony. Some adjustments therefore have to be made to develop the mechanism for military participation in decision making process, particularly on national security matters. We have the example of Turkey, Thailand,

Indonesia and Argentina, etc., where uniformed personnel are nominated for the house of representatives. This may not be true for Pakistan. Perhaps we can achieve the desired results, simply by expanding the scope of the Defence Committee of the Cabinet, without bringing about any constitutional changes. The participation of the Armed Forces in decision making process thus ensured would be a happy augury for our future well-being.

Defence expenditures of developing countries are very large. Although such expenditure indirectly contributes towards national development, yet more could be achieved, if in peace time, the resources and energies of the armed forces are directed towards national building projects, thus prohibiting them from involvement in internal matters and politics. Currently, the need to create a new economic world order is gaining momentum. Allied with this, is the need to promote the concept of regional economic zones. It helps to create poles of economic power which extend influence and project power to protect economic interests as well as provide in-built security against external aggression. Such alliances develop consensus, which creates effects of strategic dimensions. It is the crying need of the time to forge regional alliances among countries having common interests and perceptions. Regional alliances, besides ensuring economic benefits, contribute considerably towards peace. And, as peace prevails, the need to maintain large forces would be reduced, cutting on defence expenditure.

The armed forces in the developing countries have a character of their own, determined by geo-historical factors, traditions, peculiar threat environments and the social and political order which are as different and varied as the countries themselves. Such diversity of character, produces diverse responses to challenges—challenges in the form of external threat, internal disorder and collapse and degeneration of the political, economic and social order, which generally lead to military intervention. Military thus serves as a substitute of social forces which actually do not exist.

The level of political culture of a people determines the degree of public attachment to civilian institutions and the opportunity to and the likelihood of success of military intervention. Therefore, the need to develop mature political culture to deny legitimisation to military intervention, and resistance to the military rule.

Military rule is a weak alternative to a democratic order, because invariably it decays and declines as a result of the inherent weakness of rigidity of approach, tendency to compromise, ad hocism, policy of status quo and the temporary nature of such regimes. But the very fact that such interventions take place too often, it is taken for granted as part of the political order. It is, therefore, important, that measures are taken to deter intervention and if that fails, the response of the people should be so 'conditioned politically' as not to allow a military regime in power a day longer than necessary.

Development Capabilities of Fighter Jet Reviewed

93AS0065B Lahore THE NATION in English
29 Sep 92 p 7

[Article by E.A.S. Bokhari: "The Jet Trainer From Kamra"; quotation marks as published]

[Text] Kamra may be rightly called as Pakistan's Bangalore, being our aeronautical workhorse. Besides considerable rebuild, reasonable amount of manufacture (licensed) is also carried out here. I had recently been to Kamra and was told that a Chinese (China National Aero-Technology Import & Export Corporation—CATIC) product, the K-8 jet trainer is being produced in Pakistan at Kamra.

It is only fair that a jet pilot/fighter pilot is given fair amount of jet trainer hours before he is able to successfully operate his fighting jet plane. Without adequate jet trainer hours, a jet pilot may not feel very comfortable/efficient on his new machine. In fact, reasons of crashes can be attributed to lack of adequate jet trainer hours. An analysis of Indian MiG-21 crashes—and this machine has been called a 'flying coffin' by some pilots—indicates that the main reason for these crashes was inadequate jet hours, and indifferent maintenance in some cases. Of course, there was another reason and that was in-fighting between the IAF (Indian Air Force) and HAL (Hindustan Aeronautical Ltd., Bangalore—the licensed manufacturer of the MiG). The IAF apparently contended that the HAL workmanship was not adequate.

India even now is not in possession of a proper jet trainer for its burgeoning air force, their planned figure being 45 squadrons. Sometime back, the Indians were toying with the idea of getting "Alpha-Jet" aircraft. This versatile jet trainer is a product of the European joint venture of Dornier (Germany) and Dassault (France). This plane, incidentally, is also produced in Egypt at the Helwan factory and is a standard Egyptian trainer—and a very good one at that.

I am not an expert on aircraft, but from the data supplied to me by PAC (Pakistan Aeronautical Complex), Kamra, the Chinese plane appears to be quite versatile. It, however, may not match the European and American aircraft, although this plane installs a U.S. engine and its design criteria and specifications conform to U.S. standards. The engine is one turbofan TFE731-2A-2A manufactured by Garret Company, U.S.A.

Table.

Weights	
Normal take-off weight	3630 kg
Useful loads	943 kg
Internal fuel capacity	780 kg
Weight empty	2,687 kg
Flight performance	

Maximum speed	800 kph
Rate of climb at sea level	27 metres second (m/s)
Service ceiling	13,000 metres
Built-on range	1,400 km/2,250 km with drop tank
Endurance/maximum endurance	3/4.4 hours
Take-off ground run	410 metres (m)
Landing ground run	512 m
Dimensions	
Overall length	11.6 m
Overall height	4.21 m
Wing area	17.2 m ²
Wing span	9.63 m

And using a little avionics jargon, the K-8, as we call this plane in Pakistan, is a fully aerobatic jet trainer and is jointly developed by China and Pakistan at Kamra. Some of the more important credentials of this jet trainer are given in the accompanying table.

The engine of the K-8 (Karakorum) is fairly powerful, with the rated power of the maximum static thrust of 1,633 kg at mean sea level. The engine is light and weighs only 369 kg, and has a pressure ratio 13.9.

The aircraft is equipped with two Martin Baker MK-10L rocket-assisted ejection seats incorporating its escape system. It has a neat cockpit layout and EFIS [expansion not given] system manufactured by Collins Co. is fitted in both the front and the rear cockpits. Customer's option of communications consists of VHF (very high frequency) or UHF (ultrahigh frequency) or VHF/UHF radio sets and inter-communications. The navigation system is TACAN, or radio compass. Both are good.

PAC Kamra is fast developing into an efficient aeronautical outfit and besides the K-8, it already produces the light-aircraft Mushshak—the pt proficient (with the Swedish SAAB collaboration). Even an upgraded Mushshak is in the pipeline.

With the expected arrival of 40 Mirage 2000—and perhaps some MiG-29s—the range of repair, maintenance and rebuild will have to be enhanced very considerably at Kamra. As it is, there are already some old Australian-build Mirages there on which work is needed before these can become operationally fit.

Referring back to the K-8, its main features may be summed up as below:

- The plane has a wide speed range and possesses high maneuverability.
- Has satisfactory flying qualities in accordance with the requirement set forth in MIL-F-8785C for a highly maneuverable plane.
- The aircraft possesses a good field of view and the cockpit layout is very close to a combat aircraft.

- Advanced turbo-fan engine guarantees low fuel consumption and minimum operational and maintenance costs.
- Its state-of-the-art equipment includes instrumentation, communication, navigation, et al., satisfying the requirements of pilots of 1990s and beyond.
- Possesses a highly reliable escape system.
- Its advanced environmental control system consists of cockpit air-conditioning both on the ground and in the air.

- The plane has hydraulically operated braking and nose-wheel steering.
- Provides multi-role capability for training.
- Long service life of some 8,000 hours for the airframe structure.
- Possesses satisfactory endurance.

A highly rated aircraft, it should provide very adequate jet training hours to our pilots, which is so essential to cut down aircraft attrition in peacetime. K-8 is a real force multiplier for the Pakistan Air Force.

Punjab: Wyne Promises to Weed Out Crime

93AS0104D Islamabad *THE MUSLIM in English*
9 Oct 92 p 4

[Text] Lahore, Oct 8—Chief Minister Ghulam Haider Wyne told Punjab Assembly on Thursday that the government had vowed to weed out all sorts of criminal activity from the province.

Replying to a call-attention notice by a Jamaat-i-Islami legislator Mian Mehmood-ur-Rashid regarding the murder of a local trader Aqil Bari's wife and two children, the Chief Minister told the House that when Mr. Bari returned home on the night of September 5, 1992 and knocked at the door, he did not get any response from inside the house. Fearing foul play, he entered the house by scaling wall of the adjoining house and found his wife lying dead in one room and his eight-year-old son and little daughter lying in the adjacent room with slit throats. An infant daughter escaped miraculously as the assailants failed to locate her.

Mr. Wyne said the police on registration of case started investigation and arrested one Ghulam Mustafa while his alleged accomplice Aftab Masih was still at large. He said the police were conducting raids for the arrest of absconding Aftab Masih and hoped that it would soon apprehend the culprit.

The Chief Minister said he had received the autopsy report which showed that the culprits after intruding into Bari's house tried to assault Mrs. Bari criminally but stabbed her to death on her resistance.

Mr. Wyne assured the House that no criminal would be given a free hand to play with the lives of the law-abiding citizens. "Criminals backed by political elements will also be called to account," he asserted.

The Chief Minister further said the head of the bereaved family, Aqil Bari had personally contacted him and expressed the apprehension that the culprit Aftab Masih might attack Fateh Mohammad, a servant who identified the accused. He was assured by him that a special police guard had been deployed for their security.

The Speaker did not entertain the call-attention notice by Farid Ahmed Piracha which related to Karbaath tragedy in which Siddiq Malang had been killed. He said the matter was subjudice and could not be brought under discussion in the House.

Meanwhile, the Provincial Irrigation Minister, Sardar Zulfiqar Khosa informed the Punjab Assembly that the irrigation system in the province would be restored within a couple of days.

He said 1,154-mile long canals and other irrigation channels were damaged by the recent floods out of which 80 percent had been repaired while the rest would be repaired within two or three days. The bunds of Rasool, Trimmu and Punjab Headworks which were breached during the peak flood have also been repaired. However,

he added, the width of the canal banks and canal bank roads would be constructed later as the Department had only repaired the breaches of the canal in emergency for restoring the irrigation system and making the water available to the farmers for sowing Rabi crop.—PPI, APP

Assimilation, Problems of Mohajir Community Examined

93AS0030A Karachi *DAWN in English* 24, 25,
26 Sep 92

[Serial Article by Zafar Iqbal: "Provincialism and the Mohajir Dilemma"; quotation marks as published]

[24 Sep 92 p 11]

While Pakistan fitted easily into the (Indian) Muslim dream of a separate state, the (Indian) Muslims themselves quickly discovered that by and large, they had no place in the dreams of the natives of those parts of India which became Pakistan.

In West Pakistan there was quite soon an unstated and subterranean conflict between refugees from 'agreed' and 'non-agreed' areas. Those from 'agreed' areas were absorbed in Punjab. Those from the rest of India were generally lumped together as 'Tilyars', but in polite language referred to as Mohajirs, and somewhat later as 'Urdas' which is considered more descriptive and less derogatory.

The 'agreement' on which this classification was based was simply a convenient fiction.

Because of a relative paucity of Muslims in the upper echelons of the British Indian government all Indian Muslims were initially welcomed to Pakistan. Political power at that time was with Mohammad Ali Jinnah who could not be identified with any particular province (except what recently in ISPR [Inter-Service Public Relations] handouts is referred to as Jinnahpur). After his death the leadership passed on to Liaquat Ali Khan who although technically from an 'agreed' area was much too Urdu-speaking for comfort. With his elimination in 1951 the Urdu-speaking threat was decisively exterminated. That the threat had always been imaginary made no difference to the Punjabi sense of relief.

In a sense the distinction between 'agreed' and 'non-agreed' reflected the flaw in the Pakistan movement. No solution is perfect. Partition had the vociferous and, very nearly, unqualified support of Muslims of the Hindu majority areas, which contributed substantially to its success. The luckier Muslims, who got away in time from such areas, then proceeded, in due course, to become the unwelcome or at least less than welcome Mohajirs and Biharis of West and East Pakistan respectively. It was rather like people who manage to get off a sinking ship into the safety of a life-boat. Even if the life-boat lands them in territory where the natives are not entirely

friendly, at least they are on dry land, and are likely to be better off than the ones left on the ship.

Since Lahore was considered unsuitable because of its proximity to the Indian border, Karachi became the capital of Pakistan largely by default. Dhaka never counted. The refugees from the 'non-agreed' areas poured into Karachi not merely because it was the capital, but mainly because, even if it was not the best route, it was safer to travel from India through Rajasthan than through hostile East Punjab. As I recollect, the Khokhrapar border was sealed off some time in 1950 by Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan, presumably under local pressure.

In the initial years the choice between Karachi, Lahore and Dhaka simply reflected ease of access. I suppose I came to Karachi because it was easier for me to get to Karachi in late 1947. My Punjabi would have been far more fluent had I gone to Lahore, but other than that I did not, at that time, think that there was any other consequence attached to the choice of Karachi as a place of residence.

It was only when I filled out the forms for appearing in the CSS [Central Superior Services] examination in my last year of eligibility (1953), I discovered that if one had Karachi domicile, it was highly unlikely to make the C.S.P. Other domiciles were easy to acquire those days, and I understand everyone did so. As I was not keen on government service, I had no desire to make much of an effort to obtain a suitable 'domicile'. I left things as they were. I mention this because it was my first brush with the quota system, the concept of 'domicile', and its importance in Pakistan. Matters actually became progressively worse.

During the early years in Karachi, 1947 onwards, one did not come across any serious element of provincial prejudice. There were social and cultural differences—but in the small town 'refugee' atmosphere of Karachi—except for the flora and fauna, the difference from my own native town of Lucknow was not sharply felt. Even on visits to Lahore, the flora and fauna were actually more familiar; the only noticeable difference was language, and a somewhat less courteous demeanour amongst shopkeepers.

Having travelled in the Indian subcontinent one accepted differences of language, but at the same time felt the underlying unity of a subcontinental culture. So while opting for Pakistan one expected the move to be a normal occurrence, like moving to another town or to another province. Nowhere near so violent and red in tooth and claw as its reality unfolded. The implacable hatreds lying dormant for hundreds of years which surfaced had not been foreseen—certainly not by me at the age of eighteen. Thereafter, we Pakistanis kept harping on the basic and irreconcilable differences between Muslims and Hindus while the Indians kept plugging their line of the underlying unity of 'Indian' culture. Both were pursuing that part of the truth which suited their respective political postures. The whole

thing finally stuck like a broken record over Kashmir and has remained so to this day.

The Punjabi-Mohajir conflict was more in imagination than reality. After the shakeout of Ayub Khan's screening 1958/59 it was more or less sorted out to Punjabi satisfaction at the senior level of the administration. The Punjab-Bengal conflict was serious and took longer to resolve.

For some reason, people tended to assume that I hailed from Punjab. I had no objection to being mistaken for the ruling class. The only trouble was that while occasionally it led to humour, most other times it led to embarrassment.

One of my first encounters with being Punjabi happened as a young assistant Magistrate under training. There were four of us sitting practically in a line in the Rangamati Circuit House (Chittagong Hill Tracts). I was seated at the far end. The District Superintendent of Police walked in to meet us. A rather pleasant grey-haired gentleman. He inspected all of us closely.

Having walked past the other three he finally stopped in front of me and stuck his hand out saying "Thussee the fair Punjabi ho". To which taking his hand, I responded with my most convincing 'Ahoji'. My companions burst into laughter. Out of the four of us I was the only one not from Punjab.

There was nothing wrong or in any way reprehensible, in the S.P.'s [Superintendent of Police] search for a fellow-Punjabi. Stuck away in the 'hill tracts' for years he sorely needed the relaxed companionship of a shared language, background and culture. Although he had got three real Punjabis instead of one imitation, there was a remaining snag: he was from the F.C. College (Lahore) while my companions were all from the Government College. To compensate for my lack of Punjabihood, I enrolled myself in the F.C. College for the rest of the evening.

However, most of the time this error about my identity led to minor embarrassment for my Punjabi acquaintances. On one occasion Mr. Hafeez Jullunduri stormed into my office in a state of extreme agitation, fulminating in a mixture of Urdu and Punjabi "That blank blank Tilyar Deputy Secretary has mutilated my claim for travelling allowance." He went on for some time commenting on the parentage and other characteristics of the blank blank Deputy Secretary.

I pacified the old gentleman and said that I would see what I could do about his problem. After all he was a famous Urdu poet, possibly bordering on greatness. He should, in my view, have been permitted an element of poetic licence in drawing up his expense account. I interceded on his behalf with my upright but priggish colleague. I probably did not succeed in getting him everything he wanted but enough to mollify him. It seems that later on some well-wisher informed him of my real origins because he suddenly seemed to become a little wary.

There were other similar incidents—finally to avoid them, whenever anyone spoke Punjabi to me I replied in my most careful Urdu and the message would finally get through.

Compared to the general silliness of Mohajir-Punjabi tension the Punjabi-Bengali rivalry for the domination of Pakistan was a serious matter. On the whole the Punjab got the better of the exchanges. The wise men who drew up the 1956 Constitution on the basis of parity understood what they were doing. It was a good temporary effort. Whether it would have worked in the long run, is one of the ifs of history, because the (democratic) political process was derailed for years to come by the military coup of October 1958.

Yahya as the succeeding dictator of Ayub Khan was totally innocent of statecraft. The whole point of being president was to have a good time surrounded by ample women, and ample supplies of Scotch whisky. All the ills of Pakistan are now traced to the consumption of alcohol and prohibition has been wielded, mercilessly, ever since, as a political weapon. In the national ethos General Yahya continues to be a very bad advertisement for Scotch whisky. Ample women, however, have managed to hold their own.

The 1970-71 was a political watershed. The West Pakistan elite was secretly thinking of ways and means of getting rid of East Pakistan as a current and definitely future drain on West Pakistan resources; while the East Pakistan elite was wondering how to get the West Pakistan elite off their backs and at least be masters of their own house. (The only losers were to be the common people of East Pakistan.)

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Yahya Khan precipitated events by abolishing parity which was the cornerstone of a united Pakistan and by holding relatively fair elections based on the unexceptionable democratic principle of one man one vote.

The only remarkable thing about the events of 1971 is that when both leaderships were committed to de facto separation, the West Pakistan leadership secretly and the East Pakistan leadership, more or less, openly, the actual separation should have been such a needlessly brutal, bloody, and stupid business. General, then Brigadier, Farman even brought the local Mohajirs (the Biharis) into the charade of the 'Save Pakistan' action by organising them as an irregular force. The remnants of that unfortunate band of Mohajir Pakistanis are still stuck in Bangladesh under rather desperate conditions.

Given the future economic prospects of the two wings of the country Mr. Bhutto's statement on the March 26th action in 1971, that Pakistan was saved was absolutely true. What he did not clarify was that the prosperity of the Pakistan envisaged by Iqbal and Rahmat Ali had been protected by ensuring the separation of East Pakistan. It was not for nothing that he was the hero of Punjab.

The fall of Dhaka completed the process which had begun with the martial law of 1958. The first concrete step taken by this direction was the removal of the capital from Karachi and its transfer to Rawalpindi/Islamabad in 1959. For the next 30 years Karachi remained either indifferent or hostile to the central government. The Karachiites affirmed their loyalty to the Jinnahs and voted for Fatima Jinnah against Ayub. They were also not wholly amenable to the charms of Mr. Bhutto and were the spearhead of the PNA [Pakistan National Alliance] movement of 1977 which finally saw him off the political scene. Their support of Ms. Benazir Bhutto after the 1988 election became a marriage of inconvenience and foundered with the no-confidence move of 1989.

An element in the People's Party has always been anxious to fix the Mohajirs. The Great Fixer of the first PPP [Pakistan People's Party] government (1972-77) was Mr. Mumtaz Bhutto. However, the elder Bhutto realised the futility of this policy of direct confrontation and replaced him, fairly early on, with the more emollient, soothing and rather sensible Mustafa Jatoi. With the next PPP government of 1988, there might have been hopes of better sense, but when young bandits walk in through the door with guns blazing, good sense immediately dives for cover. The Urdu speakers had demonstrated their unity which could have been foreseen in the Karachi results of the 1977 elections when the P.N.A. took nine of the eleven National Assembly seats. The tenth was secured with difficulty by the PPP candidate through a gerrymandered, serpentine constituency backed by an adequate element of force.

While the Urdu speakers under the banner of the MQM [Mohajir Qaumi Movement] demonstrated unity in the 1988 elections, they were also remarkably inept in trying to negotiate a 56 or 65 point agreement with the PPP. The exact number of points is irrelevant; they were so many that they made the agreement meaningless and merely underscored the inexperience and naivete of the MQM leadership. In all fairness it must also be stated that the PPP was probably acting in bad faith and had no intention of abiding by any agreement.

After the abortive no-confidence move against Ms. Bhutto, the buried hostility surfaced with a vengeance. Pucca Qila, sniper firing, kidnapping and finally the taking of hostages. While Pucca Qila was an official operation, the rest was left to party cadres. In sniper firing and kidnapping the physical conditions favoured the champions of Sindh. In hostage taking there was probably a stand-off and, with army intervention, an exchange of hostages was arranged.

Various theories have been aired about the rise and recently, the so-called 'fall' of the MQM. General Zia, the favourite villain of all secular intellectuals, is blamed for all apparent and real sins against the nation. He was certainly ruthless about the suppression of the MRD [Movement for the Restoration of Democracy] movement in Sindh which was spearheaded by the PPP. There

was a reprehensible element of glee in the armed forces, and the Urdu speakers, about this 'sorting' out of Sindhis.

For success, the restoration of law and order must not only be done, if necessary, with a heavy hand but also with a heavy heart. There is invariably an element of truth and justice on the side of the rebel against authority. As a result of the attitudes evidenced during the suppression of the MRD movement there was and is considerable bitterness left in Sindh, which was expressed quite forcefully in the 1988 and 1990 general elections.

The emergence of the MQM however, cannot be laid at Zia's door. It was something already overdue. The influential members of the Mohajir community tended to dissociate themselves from local problems. They simply wanted to merge into their own class and get on in life, on an all-Pakistan basis; which, if I recollect correctly, was the thesis and recommendation in an article by Mr. Iqbal Jafar published in DAWN magazine.

Originally the ordinary Mohajir gave his loyalty to the PML [Pakistan Muslim League], when that failed, he turned to the Ulema. Apart from splintering the Mohajir vote, the Ulema had other priorities and were little concerned with the problems of their constituents. The sudden outburst of emotion which Karachiites showered on Sardar Abdur Rab Nishtar when they insisted on burying him in the Quaid's Mazaar—showed that they were not wholly inward-looking.

The outsider who had the best chance of emerging as the leader of Karachi was probably Air Marshal (retd) Asghar Khan. As fine a gentleman as one could hope to find anywhere in the world but as a political leader a person of remarkable ineptitude. That he had a place a Pakistan politics is confirmed by the fact that both Bhutto and Zia-ul-Haq did him the honour of treating him as a major threat and kept him bottled up in Abbottabad.

The retired Air Marshal never comprehended that if he ever had a constituency it was most probably Burns Road, Karachi, and not semi-tribal Hazara. The turnout for his triumphal entry into Karachi in February/March 1977 was remarkable. It almost seemed that Karachi had suddenly won freedom from oppression. The current oppressor of that time was Z.A. Bhutto. Anyway it is, probably now, one of the blind alleys of history, unless BB [Benazir Bhutto] plans to pit him against the charisma of Altaf Hussain in the next general elections.

Since no concerned leadership was available from the Mohajir elite—Mr. Kamal Azfar had faced his moment of truth in 1972 over the language issue, and had (sensibly) chickened out—they decided to throw up their own leadership and were, quite correctly, deeply suspicious of well-to-do Mohajirs, (like me), living on the other side of the Lyari river. Their suspicions have been

confirmed by the behaviour of Mr. Islam Nabi, who in the current crisis, promptly deserted them and stayed on with the government.

The violence between the PPP and MQM had been preceded by the ethnic confrontation between Mohajir and Pathan in the early 1980s. Although perhaps in some ways going back to Gohar Ayub's attempt at a triumphal march through Karachi to flaunt the victory of his father, the immediate cause was simply that the drivers of the private transport system were Pathans and in their frantic endeavour to maximise profits for their Pathan owners, the pedestrians they tended to run over happened to be Urdu-speakers. The Karachi police, recruited mainly from up-country, did not enthusiastically follow-up on such cases of rash and negligent driving.

Immediate lynching of the driver, or if he had absconded, setting fire to the offending vehicle seemed to be the only appropriate response from the angry crowd. This could then convert into a generalised element of bad blood between the two communities. But after a certain amount of blood-letting they learnt to live in peace with each other. Perhaps the drivers also became more careful. Whether the ISI [Inter-Service Intelligence] also did its bit to stir up the Karachi cauldron from time to time depends on one's views on conspiracy theories. I do not possess any fact to give an opinion either way.

During the second PPP government that of Ms. Benazir Bhutto, violence became a way of life in Sindh and Karachi. In the 1990 general election as far as could be seen, the PPP would win and form the government in Sindh. However, considering the existing level of violence and hostility between Sindhi and non-Sindhi a blood-bath was probably in the offing if, at that stage, the PPP came back into power. Matters could get out of hand, and the principle which would have been followed is currently being reflected in the Serbian 'conquest' and ethnic purification of Bosnia. The situation while comparable was not likely to be parallel because after a certain amount of killing the federal government would have been forced to intervene. By that time Sindh would have been brought much nearer territorial division between the warring parties.

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The government at the Centre also had a marked preference, for its own reasons, that the PPP [Pakistan People's Party] should not form the government in Sindh. Jam Sadiq Ali answered Islamabad's prayers for someone to fix Ms. Bhutto and the PPP.

He obtained a suitable reduction in the seats won by the People's Party in the 1990 elections and succeeded in forming a coalition government in Sindh with the support of the MQM [Mohajir Qaumi Movement]. The PPP was pushed into opposition. When one comes to think of

it the Old Man on the Hill had a case for trying to obtain such a result. That it also suited him otherwise, is another matter.

There were two problems inherent in the Jam Sadiq solution. The first was the boost it was bound to provide to the rapid apotheosis of Mr. Altaf Hussain. Initially he had commanded loyalty because his followers had faith in unity under his leadership. This in turn led to discipline. Once having achieved the discomfiture of the PPP, differences of opinion within the party emerged more freely. All parties (including the PPP) which are based on individual charisma tend to fascism.

The MQM celebrated its victory with a rapid adoption of fascist practices. Where earlier it had commanded, it now began to demand, loyalty. This demand if resisted was obtained through 'correction' in Aqubut Khanas. It began to prey upon the population it 'protected'; nothing like easy money for gangs of toughs who could display violence with impunity. They got so carried away with their power that they even roughed up an army Major and his party. Retribution was more or less inevitable. The Mohajir Qaumi Movement was in danger of becoming the Mohajir Qaumi Mafia.

The second problem was the element of apprehension which Punjab has about (real) Urdu speakers—although Urdu is now for all practical purposes the languages of Punjab. Urdu-speakers in control of Karachi leave Punjab with an uncomfortable feeling. They immediately start thinking of the development of Gwadar as an alternative port and straight roads to Multan across the uninhabited Balochistan plateau.

There is a strong suspicion that this led to a plan to try and divide the MQM. The MQM dissidents fleeing Karachi were given a safe haven in Lahore. Their letting loose in Karachi under the guise of MQM (Haqiqi) to coincide with the army crackdown on the MQM was a little too convenient. The MQM dissidents were reportedly the more militant, so it was not that the more peace-loving group was being supported.

There is little doubt that intimidation and physical force had been adopted by the strong-arm section of the MQM as a way of life. This is witnessed by their bashing of the Press, whom they successfully intimidated temporarily, while alienating them on a more permanent basis. The MQM were having themselves a ball.

On the other hand, when the crackdown came the ISPR [Inter-Service Public Relations] was also a bit excessive in its discovery of torture cells. When they failed to discover large caches of arms the ISPR got carried away and discovered far too many torture cells, impairing their own credibility. Whilst torture was a highly regrettable fact of life, it had not quite become a cottage industry in Karachi.

The Mohajirs and Sindhis are not alone in facing problems, but the position elsewhere is not so desparate. The Punjab at present is in the happy position of facing the

dilemma of how to remain topdog while giving the impression of being the underdog. The Pakhtun is still involved with the civil war in Afghanistan. Perhaps those with vision are already looking towards the Oxus and further North. Peshawar could still become a boom town.

In the South West the Baloch have an ethnic problem of their own with the Pakhtuns. But presumably the division is fairly clear and, therefore, ethnic confrontation is not being pursued actively by either party. Anyway, they can now look forward to providing the CIS with 'garam pani', as the warm water port is referred to in the Urdu Press. Gwadar and the road/rail across Balochistan may well have a future.

The only seriously dark spot is Sindh. The warring groups are successfully destroying its economy while clamouring for jobs—which it is now quite clear that the government cannot and should not provide. In the present economic climate jobs can only be created through economic activity in the private sector—which as Lee Kuan Yew pointed out could not take place in an environment where kidnapping was the growth industry. It was simply a statement of the obvious.

None of the parties involved (including the army) are innocent. However, the army is the only instrument available at the moment to, at least, resolve matters in the short run. Unfortunately it has weakened its position by gratuitously introducing the MQM (Haqiqi) into the mess; but with good sense the situation should be retrievable. The real problem is the restoration of law and order on a longer-term basis.

The contending parties—the urban Sindhis and rural Sindhis—to give them non-ethnic appellations, must come to a basic understanding over the importance of maintaining law and order. Some method of power-sharing would also have to be evolved if polarisation is to be prevented; otherwise bloodshed leading to a territorial division is inevitable. One possible method is to give the metropolitan government of Karachi and the city governments of Hyderabad and Sukkur greater powers; so that they become adequately autonomous. It is, however, not certain that such a solution would be effective, unless it is backed by a fair amount of good sense. A commodity in short supply.

The track record of the MQM over the last four years does not speak well. Filling up the Steel Mill with 5,000 redundant workers cannot be mistaken for wisdom. Under their stewardship municipal services in Karachi have not improved. The provision of fountains at strategic roundabouts is a poor substitute for road maintenance.

Its representatives who were ministers in the Federal and provincial governments were reported to be spending more time hanging around the 'Markaz' obtaining directions from the high command—than in looking after their portfolios. Such an attempt to exercise power from behind the scenes never succeeds. To cap it all, the

offensiveness of many of their leaders grew exponentially with their period in office. They seemed to subscribe to the view that increasing insufferability is the secret of successful government. (It is not a very unusual view, the late Mr. Bhutto also subscribed to this belief.) But fortunately for us, finally it fails.

Many people objected and continue to object strongly to the emergence of the MQM as a so-called ethnic party. The truth is that with the application of various quota systems, invariably to Mohajir disadvantage, they have had ethnicity shoved down their throats, through a process of exclusion.


Having asserted their identity because of the accident of geographical concentration they are now faced with a leadership crisis. Our bright boys like Mr. Kamal Azfar, ex-senator Javed Jabbar, and Senator Iqbal Haider cannot expect much joy from the Mohajir vote bank, because they have consorted with the 'enemy'. The ordinary Mohajir has probably decided to stick with Mr. Altaf Hussain, and believes that to break ranks at this point would lead to political disaster. Whether the MQM leadership has learned any lessons is yet to be seen. Mr. Hussain certainly exhibited much prescience by disappearing from the scene well in advance of any trouble.

No solution is possible without a political dialogue between the contending parties. This includes Ms. Bhutto and the PPP; but mention of the PPP seems to raise too many hackles in Islamabad. This is based upon an excessively rigid view of references. It is true that their justification rests on the assumption that the actions of Ms. Bhutto's government had rendered it unfit to rule without a further mandate from the people. But it does not follow that it had left Ms. Bhutto unfit forever or that she cannot learn better, or that she cannot be party to any accommodation in the interest of peace and, hopefully, prosperity in Sindh.

Horse trading is one of the essential components of practical democracy. When we want to be nice about it we call it political accommodation. The present Chief Minister of Sindh, has the advantage of not being saddled with a tough guy image. The army is fulfilling that role at the moment. He has an opportunity of playing the complementary role of conciliator. However, as a starting point for this process, there would have to be some trading of sacred cows between all the parties including Islamabad. Of course with the tacit approval of the army.

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